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ABSTRACT 
This research analyzes the design and implementation of a Maritime Command, 
Control, Computer, and Communications for Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) fly away kit (FLAK) in order to combat asymmetric threats in 
the coalition maritime environment.  This FLAK will be modular, adaptable, scalable, 
secure end-to-end, composed of routable networks, and built entirely from commercial 
off the shelf technologies (COTS). Basing measures of effectiveness (MOE) on the 
recently published Quadrennial Defense Report (QDR) and the Numbered Fleet 
Commanders Communication Message, these kits will be tested with the goal of fulfilling 
thirteen of the fifteen high priority short-falls in the modern United States CIV-MIL and 
Coalition Forces’ abilities to conduct multiple missions in the current brown (riverine), 
green (littoral), and blue (deep water) operational theatres. 
The Maritime FLAK will be designed with the intent of increasing the US 
forward presence and extending the C4ISR into restricted maritime theatres. Since US 
forces cannot intervene directly into regions like the Straits of Malacca, but can support 
coalition forces through advisors and technological adaptations, modular solutions to 
extend C4ISR into these maritime territories are needed.  Furthermore, due to the 
adaptability and scalability of the technologies to be implemented into the maritime 
FLAK, these completed kits will be able to be used by the recently formed Naval 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
The maritime theatre has changed significantly in the post-Cold War world. In 
place of massed conventional navies patrolling the oceans, new asymmetric threats have 
risen to threaten the world’s waterways. The commencement of the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT) only accelerated the need to address these threats. As stated by 
retired Coast Guard Officer Bruce Stubbs in a recent Heritage Foundation article:  
The likelihood of major combat operations at sea has diminished for the 
next two to three decades. In its place, maritime security against numerous 
non-military, non-traditional, asymmetric threats – terrorists, criminals, 
pirates, smugglers, and assorted miscreants – are highly likely. These 
threats must be defeated, preferably at their origin, or well before they 
reach America’s shores. This new national security environment places 
much greater emphasis on maritime security or constabulatory operations 
for the purpose of “good order and discipline” at sea1. 
In order to counter these threats in the maritime theatre, the United States Navy (USN) 
must not only enhance its security on its blue water forces, but expand its role in the 
littoral (green water) and riverine (brown water) theatres.    
To accomplish this, US forces must be able to patrol the vast reaches of the 
maritime theatre with a continually shrinking number of vessels, regardless of their 
distance from American Shores2. “Unsecured or ungoverned seas are potential havens for 
criminal or terrorist activity, providing relatively cheap and inconspicuous movement. 
And the thousands of miles of coastline many of us enjoy, are sometimes uninhabited and 
often difficult to regulate3. To counter these threats, the USN has expanded its GWOT 
mission requirements.  
The current expansion of mission requirements for the USN in the GWOT 
includes: 
 
                                                 
1 Stubbs, p. 1 
2 Footnote concerning the reduction in ship numbers from the planned Cold War levels of the 600 ship 
Navy – current levels equal 281 vessels. 
3 Definition of the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) from www.globalsecurity.org  
2 
• Maritime Intercept Operations (MIO) aimed at identifying and intercepting 
terrorists or weapons of mass destruction at sea, or potentially threatening ships or 
aircraft approaching U.S. territorial waters – an activity that includes Navy 
participation in the multilateral Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
• Working with the Coast Guard to build and maintain maritime domain awareness 
(MDA) – a real-time understanding of activities on the world’s oceans 
• Assisting the Coast Guard in port-security operations 
• Protection of forward-deployed Navy ships 
• Protection of Navy Bases and facilities in the United States and elsewhere 
• Development of a Riverine Warfare capability4 
 
To summarize the Navy’s GWOT roles as mandated by the US congress, the US 
Naval fleet must not only expand its presence in remote regions far from continental US 
soil, it must also integrate further with the United States Coast Guard (USCG) to develop 
a National Fleet which can create a layered and interchangeable defense in depth to 
counter all levels of maritime threats, both conventional and unconventional.  
Even if the goal of an integrated and interoperable “National Fleet” is 
accomplished, there will be insufficient forces to patrol all of the globe’s waterways. This 
places a heavy demand on the USN/USCG National Fleet’s ability to increase its layered 
defense through the enhancement of the US’ security relationships with allies overseas. 
To counter these non-traditional threats far away from the borders of the United States 
(US), the National Fleet must extend its C4ISR into maritime territories it has been 
previously unable to reach5.  
 Therefore, in order to accomplish this mission, the US does not need to add newer 
platforms or weapons systems, but instead to improve its command and control 
interoperability not only within the newly designated National Fleet, but also with 
coalition Naval and Coast Guard Forces around the globe. The guiding principle of 
homeland security sums this situation up very well in the sixth principle – an 
unprecedented level of information sharing is required by all agencies6.  
                                                 
4 According to a recent CRS report to Congress on the role of the Navy in the GWOT – Ronald O’ 
Rourke 
5 Malaysia and Indonesia rejected the US Pacific Commander ADM Fargo’s request to have 7th Fleet 
USN/USMC forces patrol the Straits of Malacca as a deterrent to maritime piracy and terrorism - 2004 
6 USCG MSHLS Introduction  
3 
The difficulty of integrating the communications of more than one military 
service has been a challenge faced by military forces for some time. With the addition of 
law enforcement forces, various government agencies, and humanitarian response groups, 
this problem increases in unprecedented complexity. Once the issue of coalition military 
forces is added into the question, this becomes a “Gordian Knot” of problem-solving7. 
This is especially true today, when current naval communications are inadequate to 
maintain the modern national fleet with its overwhelming GWOT mission requirements. 
In a recent communications message from the Numbered Fleet Commanders in 
the US Navy, ten priorities were listed, focusing on the state of current communications 
in the USN. These ten priorities are: 
1. Coalition Communications 
2. Reliable SATCOM 
3. Communications Standards 
4. Lack of Adequate Data Throughput 
5. Computer Network Defense (CND) 
6. Common Operating Picture (COP) 
7. Real-time Collaboration 
8. Streamline processes to support emergent operational requirements 
9. Next generation knowledge management (NGKM) 
10. Incorporate Wireless Technology8 
 
All of these priorities describe shortfalls within the current Command, Control, 
Computer, and Communications for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) capabilities of the US forces. Based on ever-growing mission requirements of 
Joint US Forces, these current shortfalls must be compensated for; especially since the 
increase of new force dynamics to counter these threats will increase the requirements on 
the already disadvantaged users completing these missions.  
                                                 
7 Gordian Knot refers to the myth of Alexander the Great’s slice of the knot created by the Gordian 
kings, which was rumored to be impossible to be untied. It is used to refer to impossibly complex problems.  
8 Numbered Fleet Communications Requirements Message 
4 
The small boat operators9, who will become the centerpiece of both riverine and 
maritime security operations, are also focused on in the Numbered Fleet Communications 
message. As stated in the message: 
Operational examples include the use of wireless communication from 
small boat operators to parent platforms in support of Electronic Maritime 
Interdiction Operations (EMIO). In this case, critical data collected by the 
Boarding party was quickly transmitted to the supporting intelligence 
element, thereby significantly reducing boarding time.  
The Navy must continue to support and develop its ISRT capabilities, 
systems, and processes to operate in a joint environment, especially in 
asymmetric operations in the GWOT. An over the horizon ISR 
transmission and reception system needs to be fielded to allow ships to 
stand off hostile coasts while ISR assets are able to penetrate to collection 
areas10. 
In other words, these capabilities must be linked to - and integrated with - a user 
historically removed from traditional naval C4ISR architectures. To achieve success in 
the future of maritime operations in the GWOT, these disadvantaged “last mile” 




 This research addresses the necessity of using a versatile and modular C4ISR 
Radio-WAN network architecture to maintain communications in the riverine and 
maritime theaters. The maritime theatre includes blue, green, and brown water 
environments.  
 The disadvantaged user in the maritime environment is the small boat operator. 
Due to the numerous missions they are required to accomplish without the network 
                                                 
9 Small boats, which are the primary operators in maritime security, maritime interdiction operations 
(MIO), and riverine operations, do not have the multiple communications capabilities which have been 
developing along the Network Centric Warfare (NCW) transformation in larger vessels. Much like the 
individual foot soldier, logistics and power considerations have historically prevented the link of 
communications to these operators. The technological revolution is changing this link to the 
“disadvantaged user.” It is important to note that, unlike the foot solider, the small boat has electrical 
power, like the HUMVEE and tank, and therefore can be empowered as a communications rely more easily 
than a foot soldier. This enables more connectivity to the small boat operator, who like the foot soldier, 
relies on battery power for communications links.  
10 Ibid 
5 
connectivity of the larger ships, they are more separated from NCW development than 
any other vessel. Increasing speed of data collection and linking the most remote operator 
to the collective intelligence databases around the world will greatly increase the power 
to counter asymmetric threats in the maritime environment.  
The connectivity of C4ISR systems to the operators across the digital divide must 
be established not only to empower the distributed operator, but to increase the speed of 
digital reach-back to the remote commander and intelligence collector.    
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Can IEEE 802.16  Point to Multi-point (PtMP) wireless networking technologies 
be adapted for command, control, communications, computers for intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) to be utilized by coalition maritime security 
forces in the defense against asymmetric threats in riverine, littoral, and other maritime 
theatres?  
 
D. SECONDARY QUESTIONS 
 
• Does IEEE 802.16 PtMP support tactical coalition operations in the 
maritime security theatre?  
• Does IEEE 802.16 PtMP have applicability to be an effective C3I 
application? 
• What IEEE 802.16 PtMP topology considerations should be considered? 
• How does the IEEE 802.16 PtMP technology affect Naval Coastal 
Warfare Detachment and Special Boat Unit tactical doctrines? 
• Can connectivity be maintained in maritime interdiction operations using 
the maritime FLAK? 
• Can the FLAK be produced using Commercial-off-the-Shelf equipment 
(COTS) in a cost-effective manner? 





The Scope of this thesis will include: 
 
1. An analysis of current force transformation being pursued by the 
US Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHLS). 
This review will focus primarily on current USN and USCG mission requirements, and 
the assets being used to accomplish those mission goals in the coalition maritime security 
environment. This includes shore-based port facilities as well as ships at sea.  
2. An analysis of current IEEE 802.16 technologies under the 
kinematics test parameters involving high-speed mobility. The focus of this will be to 
hypothesize the potential of IEEE 802.16 technologies to the high-speed mobile user.   
3. Finally, the test configurations will be conducted with tests for 
bandwidth, RF propagation, scalability, and functionality in a defined collaborative 
scenario test with other technology and coalition military tactical operators.  
4.  
F. CHAPTER BY CHAPTER SUMMARY 
CHAPTER I 
Introduction: This chapter highlights the obstacles facing the USN and its 
coalition allies in the current maritime theatre, including riverine and littoral environs. 
Current force transformation, increased mission requirements, and communications 
requirements to fulfill those missions will be introduced in this first chapter.  
 
CHAPTER II  
Maritime Security and Riverine Warfare: This chapter will focus on the modern 
maritime domain and the operations required of coalition forces in that environment. A 
study of the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Maritime Security Strategy 
(MHLS), and the recently published Quadrennial Defense Report (QDR) will be used to 
further highlight the requirements of the modern coalition maritime forces. A further 
study of the history of riverine warfare in the context of the newly established Naval 




Network-Centric Warfare and Distributed Operations (DO): This chapter will be a 
study of network-centric warfare in the maritime environment, the USMC DO doctrine, 
and how current technologies could be used to reach the disadvantaged user. This chapter 
will also focus on how the development of “last mile” communications is vital to the 
extension of NCW to the disadvantaged user.  
This chapter will also expand a study upon Network Centric Warfare, the GIG, 
and various service NCW endeavors. The chapter will continue with a study of how 
Mobile ad-hoc networking (MANET) requirements complement the “last mile” 
communications’ architectures. The chapter will culminate in a study of IEEE 802.16 
technologies, and how an adaptive wireless network topology using commercial-off-the-
shelf (COTS) technologies will fulfill these MANET objectives.  
 
CHAPTER IV 
Fly-away Kit Construction: The combined COTS technology components to be 
used in the FLAK will be described in this chapter. IEEE 802.16 OFDM equipment, as 
well as the adaptive modular computing and sensor technology will be described, along 
with explanations of how the M-FLAK will be integrated into an overarching network 
architecture for NCW. 
 
CHAPTER V  
Field Experimentation: This chapter will focus on the field tests of the C4ISR 
FLAK, from the commencement of IEEE 802.16 testing at Pt. Sur California on 
December 2005 through the final integrated scenario tests of the completed FLAK in 
Chiang Mai, Thailand in May 2006. Measures of Effectiveness and Measures of 
Performance will be analyzed to study the performance of the IEEE 802.16 network 




CHAPTER VI  
Conclusion and Recommendations: The culmination of this research will be 
examined in this chapter. There will be a focus on continued research areas which can be 

























II. MODERN RIVERINE WARFARE / MARITIME SECURITY 
In order to understand the communications architecture necessary for these 
missions, an analysis of the current maritime theatre is needed. Also, the multiple US 
initiatives to enhance security in this domain must be studied as well. The over-arching 
maritime security strategies, in the context of the GWOT, will be examined, to include an 
analysis of the history of riverine warfare. This study of riverine warfare will establish 
the necessary doctrinal requirements for the mission parameters for the communications 
structures for modern integrated maritime platforms. 
 
A. MARITIME SECURITY 
1. Maritime Environment 
The USS COLE (DDG 67) has become the prevailing symbol of the importance 
of maritime security in the prevention of terrorist attacks against high value maritime 
assets. Seventeen US Sailors were killed when the ship was attacked by a small boat on 
October 12, 2000, and the repairs to the stricken vessel rose to over $240 million USD 
before they were complete11. An Aegis guided missile destroyer such as the USS COLE 
is an important vessel in the US Navy’s blue water fleet, contributing to all mission areas 
supported by the modern Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) and Expeditionary Strike Groups 
(ESG). The damage to the destroyer was significant, especially considering the low cost 
of fielding small boats laden with explosives.  
 
                                                 
11 Downloaded from www.wikipedia.org on April 25, 2006 
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Figure 1.   Damage to the USS COLE (DDG 67) after the October 2000 terrorist 
assault  
 
Today, the global maritime environment is laden with threats well beyond those 
from traditional state actors. This trend is of increasing concern due to the growing 
vulnerabilities of a global economy dependent upon the modern maritime domain. 
Currently, 2.2 billion people live within 100 kilometers of a coastline; the 
maritime domain is home to 50,000 large ships that carry about 80% of the 
world's trade; and each year about 1.9 billion tons of petroleum is shipped 
by maritime transportation—approximately 60% of all the petroleum 
produced. Shipping industries around the world are taking advantage of 
the booming economy in China—shipping tonnage can barely keep pace 
with demand as Chinese exports grew 37% in 2004. In addition, a record 
10.5 million people embarked on cruise ships in 2004, an increase of about 
10% over 2003. Cruise industry analysts predict more than 11 million 
cruise passengers for 2005.12.  
 
Despite the significant level of trade, and the number of individuals traveling in the 
maritime domain daily, this arena is one of the most under-regulated portions of the 
world economy. The vulnerability of this region only becomes more apparent when these 
high-value targets become areas of significance in warfare.  
                                                 
12 VADM Morgan and RADM Martoglio 
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In the current conflict in Iraq, MABOT and KAAOT, the two vital oil rigs in the 
Kwar Abd Allah (KAA) waterway13, the Haditha Dam, and bridges on the Euphrates 
Rivers are all vulnerable to asymmetric strikes by insurgents, and must be protected. 
Maritime Security in the Gulf is critical for both the regional states and the 
global security. An estimated 15-16 million barrels of oil per day travel 
through the Straits of Hormuz to customers around the world, and any 
disruption of this traffic could have far-reaching effects on the global 
economy14.  
Current US and Coalition Forces have focused on the protection of these vital maritime 
choke points, but their deterrent presence has not prevented serious attempts by criminal 
pirate vessels from striking these targets with higher frequency. 
In the past year, even with the continued presence of Coalition Naval 
Forces in the Northern Arabian Gulf, piracy attacks have flourished, 
numbering 10 in 2005, when there were none in the previous years15. 
 
                                                 
13 Over $18,000 Dollars US in oil is passed through the Al Basrah oil terminals per second 
14 Russell, pg. 9 
15 Mukudun – Downloaded from www.iccwbo.org – International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) 
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.  
Figure 2.   2005 Pirate Attacks in the KAA 
 
Global oil consumption is projected to increase to 120 million barrels by 202016. 
Most of this oil will be shipped through vital ports on choke points around the globe such 
as the Straits of Malacca or the Suez Canal. 
Two thousand and eight hundred ports now operate as nodes for the 230 million 
containers which pass through these hubs carried on approximately 46,000 ships. Thirty 
ports are now designated “mega-ports,” defining them as critical nodes in the 
interdependent web of global commerce17.  These economic hubs are severely lacking in 
protection from external, let alone, internal threats. For example, less than .05% of all 
containers entering US harbors are searched by customs and/or security forces18. This 
creates a considerable amount of maritime territory which is under minimal supervision, 
                                                 
16 Mukudun – Downloaded from www.iccwbo.org – International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) 
17 Ibid 
18 Reference need for the sheer levels of economic material moving in and out of US ports (MHLS?) 
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yet includes the majority of the water-borne economic material in the world. Terrorist 
organizations have been utilizing this “ungoverned space” to plan and execute operations 
against hubs of global commerce.  
The October 6, 2002 Al-Qaeda assault on the French Tanker Limburg further 
highlights the type of targets maritime terrorists will seek to exploit.  The devastating cost 
of the $45 million dollars in damage was further exacerbated by the severe environmental 
cost of 90,000 barrels of oil which spilled into the Gulf of Aden19.  
 
 
Figure 3.   Damage to the French Tanker Limburg after a terrorist assault 
 
These hubs and traffic flows must be protected in order to maintain the global economy; 
the US, as the world’s largest economy and naval presence, cannot afford to remove itself 
from this endeavor. 
 
2. Maritime Security Strategic Initiatives 
The National Security Strategy required a shift in the intelligence community 
from the traditional Cold War endeavor of collecting intelligence on the Soviet Bloc to 
tracking a multitude of disparate and elusive sets of targets20. In order to accomplish this, 
                                                 
19 Downloaded from www.wikipedia.org on April 25, 2006 
20 NSS and MHLS Reports 
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the traditional intelligence organizations must integrate more closely with the numerous 
law enforcement and regulatory agencies concerned with safe trafficking of commerce on 
the world’s oceans. More importantly, these agencies must integrate with those civilian 
corporations which are traveling on the “front lines” of this less than conventional war.  
Historically, “in surface transportation, timely information-sharing has been 
hampered by the lack of standard protocols to exchange information among federal, state, 
and local government agencies and private entities”21. This level of information-sharing 
is changing with the apparent increase in vulnerabilities being exploited by asymmetric 
threats on the world’s waterways.  
Databases are being linked in order to give all agencies and actors free and ready 
access to vulnerability assessments, timely indications and warnings, actionable 
intelligence, and operational data to the greatest extent permissible by law22. An 
Enterprise Architecture will link traditional intelligence23 databases to non-traditional law 
enforcement and customs databases24 until a total interagency fusion can be 
accomplished, resulting in complete and immediate information sharing25.  
This collection will still need to be done by the physical and remote presence of 
operators far from American soil. This will be the work of the modern riverine and 
maritime domain awareness forces of the NECC. Their collection of intelligence by a 
direct and indirect presence, reconnaissance and surveillance, and observation will 
complete the desired Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) picture required by the NSS. 
Using Knowledge Management (NGKM), the mass of information being passed across 
the databases can be managed, and then disseminated to vector necessary platforms to 
interdict threats around the world.  
The Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, building on the NSS, 
combined their strategic objectives for maritime security with four national objectives26. 
These national objectives are: 
                                                 
21 O’ Rourke CRS CG report – July 2004 – CRS-21 
22 USCG MHLS 
23 Defense, strategic 
24 Immigration, biometric 
25 USCG MHLS 
26 O’ Rourke CRS CG report – July 2004 – CRS-21 
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• To prevent terrorist attacks and criminal or hostile acts 
• To protect maritime-related population centers and critical infrastructure  
• To minimize damage and expedite recovery from attacks within the 
maritime domain 
• To safeguard the ocean and its resources27.  
 
The Navy and the Coast Guard are both working their C4ISR architectures in order to 
accomplish these mission requirements. 
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), ADM Michael Mullen, has various 
strategic initiatives with the Global Maritime Intelligence Initiative (GMII) in 
conjunction with the Joint Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) and MDA to 
support interagency operations. As CNO, he has established the NECC at the Naval 
Amphibious Base Little Creek, Virginia on January 13, 2006 and has leveraged National 
Fleet Policy to coincide with the United States Coast Guard and the National Strategy for 
Maritime Security.  
The Coast Guard's MDA requirements are being funded at higher levels, 
indicating recognition of higher priority. To enhance their current missions delineated in 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the following five areas of focus are highlighted:  
1. Ports, waterways, and coastal security 
2. Defense readiness 
3. Drug interdiction 
4. Migrant interdiction 
5. Other law enforcement, including foreign fishing vessel incursions 
The Coast Guard’s current forces need considerable enhancements to increase their ISR 
capabilities to the required levels on all of the United State’s maritime environs. Increases 
in the Homeland Security budgets have increased the ability of US national forces to 
achieve these goals. In a recent congressional report, the budget initiatives were  
It provides for critical increases in intelligence capabilities to enhance 
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). MDA will provide comprehensive, 
timely, and detailed visibility into events, conditions and trends in the  
 
 
                                                 
27 O’ Rourke CRS CG report – July 2004 – CRS-21 
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maritime domain that will assist Coast Guard Operational Commanders in 
the early detection of potential threats and optimizing allocation of 
operational assets.28. 
The Coast Guard will funnel these initiatives into the Deepwater project, Rescue 21, 
Automatic Identification System (AIS), and Response boat Medium Projects. These are 
necessary enhancements to the USCG forces, which have been hard-pressed to 
accomplish a significant portion of its missions prior to September 11th.  
The overall governmental support for these initiatives is firmly entrenched within 
the recently published Quadrennial Defense Report (QDR). The QDR states several 
further areas of improvement which are required for all forces in the GWOT. All of these 
areas directly effect the transformation of maritime forces, and their integrated C4ISR 
network architectures: 
• Human Intelligence to discern the intentions of the enemy 
• Persistent Surveillance to find and precisely target capabilities in denied areas 
• Capabilities to locate, track, and tag terrorists in all domains 
• Special Operations Forces to conduct direct action, foreign internal defense, 
counterterrorist operations, and unconventional warfare 
• Capabilities to help fuse intelligence and operations to speed action based on 
time-sensitive intelligence 
• Multipurpose forces to train, equip, and advise indigenous forces,; deploy and 
engage with partner nations; conduct irregular warfare; and support security, 
stability, transition, and reconstruction operations 
• Riverine capabilities to improve the ability of US forces to work with the 
security forces of partner countries to deny terrorist groups the use of 
waterways 
• Joint coordination, procedures, systems, and, when necessary, command and 
control to plan complex interagency operations. 
• Broad, flexible authorities to enable the United States to rapidly develop the 




                                                 
28 O’Rourke, p. 2 
29 Quadrennial Defense Report, p. 23-24 
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The QDR also states the need for an enhanced maritime domain awareness 
capability to provide situational awareness and shared information on potential threats 
through rapid collection, fusion, and analysis30. All of these strategic requirements, as 
well as an assessment of their progress, must be integrated as seamlessly as possible. The 
blurred lines of the National Fleet concept’s new mission parameters make this 
integration even more difficult to accomplish.  
 
3. National Fleet Concept 
The combined USCG and USN forces combine to become what is now defined as 
the National Fleet. Both of these forces will support the missions of the Department of 
Defense as well as the Department of Homeland Security. Their missions will blur, and 
become interoperable.  
The current National Fleet Maritime Security Operations Model is designed to 
utilize the full range of the capabilities of the USN and USCG assets against the full 
spectrum of threats in the theatre today. These threats are: 
• Human smuggling and slave trade 
• Drug Trafficking and narco-terrorism 
• Arms and monetary smuggling 
• Passenger vessel protection 
• Critical Infrastructure protection 
• Mining of strategic ports 
• High value asset protection 
• Surveillance and broadcasting 
• Border security threats 
• Sea lines of communication security 




                                                 
30 QDR, p. 27 
31 National Fleet Report 
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The USN will be utilized for high intensity conflict, focusing on maritime 
defense, while the USCG will focus on low-intensity conflict. The spectrum of maritime 
security will belong to the USCG and maritime defense will fall under the umbrella of the 
USN, but the defined lines which separated these missions are no longer exact. What is 
important to note is that in order to meld these defined mission lines, both sides of the 
National Fleet must become network-centric and interoperable in its communications.  
 
4. International Maritime Security Initiatives 
Maritime Initiatives have grown significantly in the new millennium. The 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the World Customs Organization (WCO) 
have published various initiatives to increase the level of maritime security to further 
protect the level of international commerce32. The December 2002 conference of the 
IMO amended the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International Ship and Port 
Security (ISPS) code, but both of these measures are voluntary, and require work by the 
member countries to enforce the standards. 
The ISPS code has become a cornerstone of future surface shipping and 
commerce security. The IMO is managing a database of all shipping traffic from member 
nations of the 1974 SOLAS convention33. Although the IMO is producing guidance and 
managing the overall database, individual nation-states are enforcing their own 
technological adaptations within the code requirements.  
The US has focused the additional codes to comply with SOLAS by adding the 
Automated Identification System (AIS), which fulfills the ID requirement of all ships 
over 300 gross tons34. The AIS is an important facet of blue-force tracking which is an 
integral part of all services’ NCW concepts. The AIS will enable the US to fulfill ISPS 
code requirements for the military ships, and begin a move towards improving private 
steps to increase overall port security.  
                                                 
32 O’ Rourke CRS CG report – July 2004,  CRS -13 
33 ISPS code data and IMO management of the database can be researched further @ www.imo.org 
34 O’ Rourke CRS USN report – FEB 2006 – CRS-2. Small boats, which are under the 300 ton 
threshold, are a major security problem.  Few fishing boats, for example, exceed these levels.  A lot of 
ammonium nitrate can be placed into a crab boat, making small boast interdiction still vital despite these 
technological advances. 
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The WCO has a significant membership of 161 countries possessing 97% of the 
world’s trade35. The WCO initiated the “Resolution on Security and Facilitation on the 
International Supply Chain” in June 2003, which attempts to standardize the data 
elements needed to identify high risk cargo and exchange information between exporting 
countries and importing countries customs services36. Still, like the IMO, initiatives 
require money in which to set-up and enforce. The US Congress has approved a 
“Maritime Security Trust Fund” to help countries improve their own port security37.  
Other initiatives such as the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) were 
started, which was a Pacific Command plan to integrate PAC-RIM nations to cooperate 
on maritime security by focusing on joint patrols and information sharing, and are being 
implemented. As described on the intelligence global security website: 
The goal of RMSI is to develop a partnership of willing regional nations 
with varying capabilities and capacities to identify, monitor, and intercept 
transnational maritime threats under existing international and domestic 
laws.  
This collective effort will empower each participating nation with the 
timely information and capabilities it needs to act against maritime threats 
in its own territorial seas. As always, each nation will have to decide for 
itself what response, if any, it will take in its own waters.  
Information sharing will also contribute to the security of international 
seas, creating an environment hostile to terrorism and other criminal 
activities. Any RMSI activity in international waters will be in accordance 
with existing international law.  
Once a decision has been made to act against an emerging threat, maritime 
interdiction capabilities obviously will be required. In most instances, 
these will take the form of law enforcement or customs vessels, but 
military forces may be needed for more organized threats, especially on 
the high seas.  
RMSI will be a partnership of regional nations who are willing to 
contribute their resources to enhance maritime security. It is not a treaty or 
an alliance. Nor will the RMSI result in a standing naval force patrolling 
the Pacific.  
                                                 
35 O’ Rourke CRS CG report – July 2004 – CRS -13 
36 Ibid 
37 Ibid, p. CRS-18 
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The Proliferation Security Initiative, or "PSI" and RMSI are related, but 
the PSI is a global effort to stem the proliferation, by any means, of 
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. PSI does not 
address other transnational threats. RMSI, on the other hand, will be 
focused on maritime transnational threats in the Asia-Pacific region38.  
These initiatives will be necessary to integrate in order to create a realistic “unblinking 
eye” of ISR. 
 Due to considerable opposition, RMSI was not able to be implemented because 
the cornerstone of the effort was to utilize US forces to patrol the sovereign maritime 
territories of other countries. This fact caused a “sudden death” for the initiative, but it 
still highlighted the importance of multilateral cooperation in achieving maritime security 
in regions like Southeast Asia. The loss of RMSI only re-enforces the need for C4ISR 
capabilities which can link the regional databases which already exist around the world.  
Databases like the IMB’s Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) in Kuala Lumpur must 
be integrated to track trends and intelligence on maritime piracy. As one of the growing 
asymmetric threats in the world, this global, and non-military, intelligence management 
of data will become vital to combat threats in the maritime domain. This also means the 
number of non-military forces which must be integrated into the maritime security 
architecture is considerable. Without these numerous international security agencies, 
there will be significant gaps in the information-sharing capabilities of these security 
forces.  
 
5. Coalition Security Initiatives 
The US global perspective on security initiatives must be balanced with the 
regional security initiatives of nation-states focused on regional maritime security. The 
proclaimed RMSI proposed by ADM Thomas Fargo in 2004 was an attempt to 
consolidate these numerous civilian, international, and military forces. ADM Fargo 
addressed the US congress with a plan to have US Navy/Marine Corps forces patrol the 
                                                 
38 Downloaded from www.globalsecurity.org on April 30, 2006 
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Straits of Malacca. Although Singapore responded with support, both Malaysia and 
Indonesia responded to the US initiative with prejudice.  
Malaysia and Indonesia have very different national security priorities from those 
of the United States. First and foremost, both of these countries list threats to their 
national sovereignty as the greatest danger to their national security. Maritime terrorism, 
piracy, and threats to their fishing fleets rank very low in comparison to other national 
security threats. This highlights the difficulty of implementing a regional maritime 
security agreement. Still, some countries have built upon the model of regional 
cooperation, realizing that trans-national efforts are required to solve global problems.  
Singapore has initiated very important maritime security projects in the past 
decades, and has only accelerated these projects in the five years following the events of 
September 11th, 2001. These projects have led to very important improvements in the 
Singapore counter-terrorism infrastructure.  
Singapore has ordered six of the French-multi-mission frigates which will extend 
the patrol footprint of the city-state out to the whole Straits of Malacca, the Indian Ocean, 
and the South China Sea39. Singapore is the only ASEAN member nation which is also a 
member of the 11-nation Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)40. Singapore has also built 
a joint counter-terrorism center, which integrates law enforcement and intelligence for 
interagency data fusion41. 
Improvements in countries’ information-sharing capabilities have led to 
countering maritime terrorist strikes before they can occur. For example, the Asian 
Regional Forum (ARF) improvements on sharing security data prevented planned Jemaah 
Islamiyh (JI) strikes against US vessels transiting the Straits of Malacca42. 
The ARF has coordinated Cooperation against Piracy, focusing on “regional 
cooperation to ensure that maritime criminals and pirates do not evade prosecution.” This 
has defined a need for an “effective response to maritime crime requires regional 
                                                 
39 Simon, p. 274 
40 Ibid 
41 Ibid 
42 Ibid, p. 278 
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maritime security strategies and multilateral cooperation in their implementation”43. The 
ARF is designing a counter-piracy initiative with the understanding of the obstacles: 
• 80% of the world’s maritime trade occur among the ARF nations 
• The majority of  the piracy in Southeast Asia occurs in coastal and 
archipelagic waters 
• Cooperation between Navies and Coast Guards, shipping agencies, and 
port authorities44 
To overcome many of these obstacles, the ARF nations are working on cooperative anti-
piracy exercises, merchant marine training, and the designation of naval vessels for the 
prescribed shipping traffic lanes45. But even ARF still faces the “total consensus” voting 
style of the ASEAN nations.  
 Emerging security issues in Southeast Asia are: 
• Piracy 
• Smuggling 
• Illegal immigration 
• Trans-national Oil Spills 
• Incidents at Sea 
• Search and Rescue 
• Navigational Safety 
• Exchange of maritime Information 
• Illegal Fishing 
• Management of Resources in areas of overlapping claims46 
All of these issues are essentially problems of a civil nature, but require the necessary 
intervention of military forces47. Therefore, military forces in the region must grow in 
their mission capabilities to deal with a much broader range of responsibilities and 
priorities48. 
                                                 
43 Ibid, p. 278-279 
44 Ibid, p. 279 
45 Ibid 
46 Valencia, Mark – The Asian Maritime Security Context, p. 11 
47 Ibid 
48 Piracy numbers since the MALSINDO patrols began 8 months ago have been extremely  
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Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150) has developed out of the United States-led 
coalition enforcing the United Nation’s Security Council resolutions 661 and 665. CTF 
150 is currently commanded by a Royal Netherlands Navy Commodore, Frank Ord. The 
previous Commander was the French Vice Admiral Jacques Mazars. Overall, CTF 150 
has involved participants from the navies of Germany, France, Pakistan, the Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. This model of coalition cooperation on the 
high seas is beginning to spread to remote positions in the maritime environs.  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Operation Active Endeavour and 
Operation Active Effort are spear-heading similar multi-national efforts to patrol the 
Mediterranean to deny the forces of global maritime terrorism from assaulting the 
economic lifeblood between Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Insignia for the recently formed Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency 
 
The Straits of Malacca, where more than fifty thousand ships pass each year 
carrying over ninety-five percent of Eastern Asia’s crude oil (80% of Japanese crude oil; 
50 % of international cargo shipping trade), has become an obvious vulnerability. Severe 
repercussions would result from a maritime terrorist attack upon shipping in the Straits. 
Since the vulnerability of shipping has been made abundantly clear by the annual 
increase is violent piracy assaults upon numerous ships in transit along the one thousand 
kilometer straight. 
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Currently, Norwegian Intelligence points to Al Qaeda control of 15-23 freighters, 
flying flags form the countries of Somalia, Tongal, and Yemen49  
Examples of emerging security networks include Black Sea Harmony in 
Eastern Europe, Caspian Guard in the Caspian Sea, and the counter-piracy 
initiative in the Strait of Malacca50. 
 
B. RIVERINE WARFARE 
Riverine warfare strategic initiatives must be integrated with the overall maritime 
security strategy. Rear Admiral Donald K. Bullard of Naval Expeditionary Combat 
Command stated: 
The goal of naval thinking today, said Bullard, should be to “build 
awareness from the blue water to the green water to the brown water, in an 
integrated battle space.” The maritime environment is a more complex 
matrix now. “You have to put riverine into this bigger picture,” Bullard 
said. “It’s not alone.”51 
Since the USN has not operated an active duty riverine force since the close of the 
Vietnam War, the history of riverine operations will be studied in order to establish 
mission requirement parameters for the communications architecture.  
 
1. History of Riverine Warfare 
The United States Navy has a long and distinguished history in riverine warfare. 
From before the Revolutionary War to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), US 
military forces have operated, both in peace and war, on “brown water”52. This history 
has been far from consistent, though, and has also been characterized by episodic periods, 
where riverine capabilities were completely removed from the USN inventory. Thomas 
Cutler, the author of Brown Water, Black Berets, states that: 
 
                                                 
49 Russell, p. 10. The first US Amphibious Landing was actually performed by the US Army, with the 
US Revenue Cutter Service (Precursor to the USCG) during the Seminole War in Florida    
50 VADM Martoglio 




Brown water warfare has been used time and again, but on every occasion, 
once the necessity has passed, these capabilities were shelved and the 
Navy returned to “blue-water” operations53 
This is extremely important because the USN has not operated a full-time and active 
Riverine command since the close of the Vietnam War.  
Yet riverine operations have not been totally removed as a vital component of 
warfare and peace-keeping operations as they have been maintained by both the Army 
and the Marine Corps since the Vietnam War. The reason these forces were maintained 
was to conduct operations like counter-narcotics and nation-building. The functionality of 
riverine forces is that they control the one form of natural infrastructure used in third 
world countries, as expressed in the following passage:   
Rivers serve as lines for communications, transportation, and trade – can 
be more vital than roads in many remote regions – especially where there 
are more navigable rivers than roads54. 
Riverine warfare is as old as the country itself, and began with operations being 
conducted against the British during the Revolutionary War on the Delaware River55. It 
would continue throughout America’s Indian Wars, and then again against the Barbary 
Pirates.  
Gaining prominence during the “Jeffersonian Gunboat Era,” riverine warfare 
reached a culminating period with the American Civil War, when US Naval monitors 
would work in concert with Ulysses S. Grant’s Army to combat Southern Rebel forces 
along the Mississippi River56. Riverine warfare would take a back-seat to the global 
naval aspirations of the US during the latter half of the nineteenth century, but would 
slowly rise again once the US presence reached to the far corners of the globe.  
The Chinese Navy traversed rivers for years of peace-time patrolling (continuing 
until the Japanese invasion of China) while exercising a form of US gunboat diplomacy. 
Large-scale navies are still the primary focus of nation-states even as the blue water focus 
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shifted from battleships to aircraft carriers during World War II, prompting riverine 
forces to once again fall to the wayside of naval operations.  
The Vietnam era would usher in another era of riverine warfare as the new 
technology and modern doctrine merged to establish a versatile multi-mission force to be 
deployed on the rivers of Southeast Asia. Most of the modern lessons of riverine warfare 
developed during the Vietnam War. 
After the close of the Vietnam War, there was a reduction in the importance of 
riverine warfare, resulting in the USN deactivation of active riverine warfare commands, 
and a shift of its remaining Patrol Boat Squadron to Naval Special Warfare Reserve 
Commands. The USMC did not abandon its role in riverine warfare, and adapted FDI 
support forces to develop South American riverine forces for counter-narcotics 
missions57. The USMC forces trained the Bolivian Devils and established the Colombian 
Riverine Program58. These operations were successful, but were primarily under the 
auspices of Special Warfare, and were removed from the traditional aspects of Naval 
Warfare in the active duty Navy.  
Throughout the history of naval riverine warfare, the classical tenets of the US 
doctrine which have developed are as follows: 
- Harassing Fire  
- Fire Support 
- Riverine Amphibious Assaults 
- Mobile Riverine Operations 
- Direct engagements with other crafts59 
These classical riverine warfare tenets are developed into three basic tactical 
necessities: 
 
1) Harassing Fire / Interdicting Fire 
2) Fire Support / Riverine Amphibious Landings / Mobile Riverine Forces 
3) Direct Engagements with Vessels60 
                                                 





The Vietnam Era expanded these missions by defining five specific mission areas 
which were required during riverine missions: 
1. River Assault 
2. River Patrol and Control 
3. River Minesweeping 
4. Special Operations Support 
5. Fire Support from the Rivers 
6. Consolidated Missions and Task61 
The lessons from the history of riverine warfare are still the basic tenets of modern 
riverine warfare and security operations in peace-keeping missions. 
The other important lessons from the Vietnam War are the necessity of 
interoperability with the logistics and aviation support elements. Riverine forces do not 
operate alone62. Close air support, directed by capable communications throughput, is 
vital to mission accomplishment. Whether directing US Close Air Support (CAS) during 
operations or directing the significant logistical support to the mobile riverine operators, 
communications must be maintained.  
It is important to note the versatility of riverine forces in peacetime as well which 
has to integrate with the population.  
riverine warfare ... is not control of just the rivers and canals, it is control 
of the whole area, and that takes more than just boats,” said Captain Hock, 
“You have to become part of the culture. You have to integrate63. 
Modern responses to humanitarian disasters will require not only a military response, but 
a mixed governmental, non-governmental, and volunteer collaboration. A capable and 
interoperable riverine force would have been extremely useful during the humanitarian 
efforts undertaken by CIV-MIL forces during Hurricane Katrina Relief Missions.  
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62 While Riverine craft are the centerpiece of any Riverine Operation, they cannot carry out any 
significant riverine missions by themselves. Nor are they single-service.  When the Army started getting 
effective at interdicting the shore threads of the Ho Chi Minh trail, the coastal munitions smuggling 
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mortar piggy-backed on it.  And the boats were repainted grey.  When the drawdown occurred, all these 
WPBs were turned over to South Vietnamese Navy. - Benbow, p. 21.    
63 CAPT Kwan Do (ret) of the Vietnamese Navy – Eric Mills Seminar summation 
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2. Current Riverine Environment 
 In analyzing the 60 non-integrated countries where Foreign Internal Defense 
(FID) missions are to be executed by deployable US riverine forces, almost every one of 
these countries fall along the equator. 64 The median income among these countries 
averages $2450 US dollars per year, and contains 30 percent of the world’s waterways65. 
This means the US can expect to deploy these forces to an extremely hot (desert or 
jungle) and generally poor environment to work alongside coalition host nation (HN) 
forces with very little communications capability. Also, this means military forces which 
are lacking an infrastructure to support difficult to maintain systems when US forces are 
not invited, and can only provide technical assistance through advisors.  
 
3. Modern Riverine Doctrine 
Riverine Warfare is inherently joint, often combined, and always complex, 
requiring continual close combat and the management of combined arms66. The main 
missions to be undertaken by the modern US riverine force are:  
• Security Assistance 
• Counter-Insurgency (COIN) 
• Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) 
• Major Combat Operations (MCO)67 
Traditionally, the riverine maritime theatre has been managed separately from the overall 
US blue water forces. The maritime domain is directly related to maritime security, and 
must be treated as such in strategic planning.  
There are 60 countries which are currently considered to be the modern non-
integrated gap. In these countries, the US may be called upon to conduct FID operations 
in support of the GWOT and where there are a collective 201,000 kilometers of 
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pg. 1. 
67 Benbow CNA Report – “Renewal of Navy’s Riverine Capability: A Preliminary Examination of 
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waterways and 21 river deltas68. These riverine environments are all significantly 
different and robust communications capabilities will be required to compensate for these 
differences. One of the key obstacles to overcome this is the communications 
interoperability with indigenous para-military and military forces, which must be 
connected with US riverine operators69. The necessary parameters for these 
communications links must be defined.  
It has been a number of years since a US joint operational doctrine for riverine 
tactics has been updated. Historical lessons from experiences of operators are the sole 
source of lessons learned from which a new doctrine can be devised.70. Therefore the 
historical lessons from riverine warfare must be used as the guidelines for the future.   
According to the CNA study on “The Future of the Navy’s Riverine Capability” 
published in March 2006, the following requirements for ISR and C3 are defined as 
follows: 
ISR 
• Employ visual and electronic sensors 
• Employ human exploitation team (HET) to collect local HUMINT 
• Coordinate with Rotary-wing (RW) recon support for river patrol  
C3 
• Conduct joint mission planning, including employment of joint 
intelligence products 
• Provide C2 organic fires and maneuver 
• Integrate direct fires and maneuver with adjacent GCE 
• De-conflict organic direct fires with friendly forces and facilities in the 
vicinity (IVO) waterways.  




                                                 
68 Ibid – the non-integrated gap of countries is characterized by The Pentagon’s New Roadmap: War 
and Peace in the Twenty-first Century (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004). It refers to the countries outside of the 
core which have not bonded into mutually assured dependence through integration into the world’s 
economy. The gap includes countries which can take a path towards integration, or in opposition to 
globalization.  
69 Benbow, p, 21 
70 Joint Riverine Doctrine was last refined  
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Other Supporting Information Operations (IO) mission requirements 
• Conduct IO IVO waterways71 
 
These mission parameters match much of the informational requirements for other DO 
missions in the current military architecture. The non-C4ISR mission capabilities revolve 
around similar operational mission parameters, and simply focus on the area of  
 The CNA report focuses further on what it considers to be obstacles to achieving 
a superior C3 environment in this field of operations; primarily foliage obstruction, 
communications relay, chain of command structure, and weather conditions72. 
 
C. NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY COMBAT COMMAND (NECC) 
On October 1, 2005, the NECC was created by the USN, and the future naval 
riverine force was planned as one of its elements73. The other elements include other 
previous organizations: the Naval Coastal Warfare Squadron (NCWS), Explosive 
Ordinance Disposal (EOD), Mobile Diving and Salvage, Naval security, Naval 
Expeditionary Construction Battalions, and other specialized deployable commands74. 
According to RADM Donald K. Bullard, the NECC was created to “fill the gaps in 
security between the big ships that patrol the deep blue waters and the troops ashore that 
are exploited by the Cole attack” 75  
The Riverine Warfare Group (NRG-1) will deploy three river combat forces of 
twelve boats each76. Each of these 12 boat teams will be split into four different groups, 
each manned by five-man crews, enabling a port and starboard rotation during surge 
operations. These riverine groups will be deployable around the globe, and thus making 
the Combatant Commanders (who may have considerable riverine mission requirements) 
compete for their availability. 
It’s no coincidence that the dual missions of maritime security and riverine 
combat are co-located in the same recently established command in the US Navy. The 
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dual nature of conducting military and constabulatory operations in both a peacetime and 
wartime context has made small boat operators, whether in the USCG, the USN, or a 
coalition ally operating with them, mirror images of each other.  
Although no specific mission set of force construct has been defined, the NECC 
Riverine Group has established their operational subset to bring area control, counter-
piracy, interdiction, insert/extract, fire support coordination, and identify/locate/destroy 
missions firmly and officially77. These missions will become the cornerstone of modern 
riverine and maritime security initiatives. 
The NECC will deploy its riverine forces to support OPERATION: IRAQI 
FREEDOM by 2007 in order to replace the USMC riverine forces conducting maritime 
security missions78.  
Also deploying in 2007 under the NECC command structure will be the Naval 
Coastal Warfare Squadron Five (NCWS 5), which will focus on the maritime security 
mission79. The NCWS will focus on missions in littoral areas, like the Al Basrah 
terminals in the NAG, counter-piracy along the Horn of Africa, and South Korean littoral 
patrols along the Demilitarized Zone on the 38th Parallel80.  The NCWS will also fulfill 
missions in support of law enforcement and the USCG.  
The communications interoperability which must be achieved by the NECC and 
its multitude of multi-mission small boat squadrons will require significant bandwidth 
and distance links despite numerous different architectures and topologies being 
structured in the “last mile.” A breakdown on the many different crafts which must be 
linked, from current ships in the US and coalition force to the up and coming NECC 
craft, will highlight that modularity is vital to overcoming this obstacle.  
 
D. MARITIME AND RIVERINE CRAFTS 
It must be stated that speed and mobility will be critical facets of riverine warfare 
doctrine, especially concerning the high speed small boats in the current US Joint 
inventory. As USMC Major Ivan Monclova, USMC, Deputy Naval Mission Chief, 
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Bogota, Colombia, and USMC Representative to the Colombian Marine Corps stated 
about his experiences in riverine warfare: “Enemy sniper fire is death on wheels. If 
you’re not moving fast, you’re definitely a target”81. As shown by the chosen crafts for 
the modern riverine warfare forces, speed is vital to doctrine, and therefore, 
communications must take this speed into account.  
In final, it is important to note the Earth is 75 percent water, and thus it is 
physically impossible for these boats to patrol every section of the globe’s oceans 
simultaneously. This “boring of holes in the ocean” is pointless without an integrated 
communications architecture to enable these ships to operate in an interoperable manner. 
Information systems which can focus the multiple aviation assets necessary to patrol are 
necessary. The following analysis of small boats will focus on the kinematics of 
interdiction boats, and the logistical placement of the modular maritime fly-away kits.  
 
1. Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIB) 
The Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB) is the standard operating craft for maritime 
security and MIO operations. The Naval Special Warfare (NSW) RHIB is rugged and can 
maintain a 200 nautical mile range at 32 knots with a 45 knot top speed82.  The NSW is 
C-130 transportable and can carry either 3200 pounds of payload or eight passengers. The 
RHIB also possesses an antenna array which stands close to ten feet in height, ideal for 
the placement of FLAK IEEE 802.16 antennas.  
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Figure 5.   Naval Special Warfare RHIB 
 
2. Special Operations Craft – Riverine (SOC-R) 
The Special Operations Craft – Riverine (SOC-R) is the new riverine warfare 
craft utilized by the US Navy. Comparable to the RHIB in size, speed, and payload 
capacity, the SOC-R has few definable characteristics which would require a distinct 
change in testing parameters concerning the addition of MANET communications 
architecture onto the craft83. 
Like the NSW RHIB, the SOC-R is also produced by US Marine, INC. The SOC-
R Cyclone is a replacement for Vietnam-era PBR-style riverine combatant craft.  
 
                                                 
83 The SOC-R possesses comparable Key Performance Parameters (KPP) to the RHIB – C-130 
transportable, 33 foot length, 200 nm range 
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Figure 6.   Naval Special Operations Craft – Riverine (SOC-R) 
 
3. Small Unit Riverine Craft (SURC) 
The SURC is the USMC’s vehicle to conduct Military Operations in the Riverine 
Environment (MORE)84. Designed to achieve speeds of close to 40 knots, the SURC is 
capable of beaching itself for land-based assaults. The SURC is transportable by both the 
CH-53 Helicopter and MV-22 Osprey.  Also, the SURC has a modern communications 
suite, capitalizing on advanced digital technology and the use of the US Army’s Combat 
Radio Network (CRN)85.  
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Figure 7.   USMC Small Unit Riverine Craft (SURC) 
 
The SURC is designed to carry 13 to 18 marines, the equivalent of a squad. The 
SURC-E is planned to be a combat support element for the standard SURC, which will 
operate primarily as a troop carrier for a rifle squad. The SURC is designed specifically 
for another vital aspect of riverine warfare: going ashore. 
As previously stated by various officers and sailors who experienced brown water 
warfare in the Vietnam Era and counter-drug operations in SOUTHCOM, placing boats 
on the water without the ability to go ashore simply creates asymmetric targets for the 
enemy. As USMC Major Ivan Monclova stated at the Naval Institute conference on 
riverine warfare:   
“You have to get off the boat.” Civilian assistance—providing medical 
aid, delivering essential supplies, and any other type of goodwill 
initiatives—has to be perceived as a crucial part of the mission. Not only 
are you doing a good deed, observed Monclova, but “you’re taking those 
villages away as bases of operations” for the bad guys86.  
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The QDR highlights the recent addition of over 3700 personnel to the current 
military force for the purpose of conducting civil affairs and psychological operations87. 
These forces will be required to operate in regions with minimal logistical and 
transportation support. This means their missions will become closely integrated with the 
missions of the NECC. 
In Vietnam, the use of a US Navy riverine advisory effort enabled increases in 
indigenous riverine security capabilities. This is much like what is envisioned for the 
international security cooperation programs desired by the US and its allies today88. In 
many of the countries where civil-military operations will occur, rivers are the sole form 
of transportation and communication89.  
 
4. Special Operations Craft – MK V PEGASUS 
The MK V Pegasus SOC is the largest special operations crafts operated by NSW. 
At 82 feet, the MK V is three times as long as the Cyclone and the NSW RHIB. The MK 
V also possesses much greater range than the other two small boats, yet is still small 
enough to be transported by two USAF C-5 aircraft within forty-eight hours of 
notification.  
 
Figure 8.   Special Operations Warfare Craft MK V Pegasus  
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The communications suite of this craft is much more robust than those onboard 
the Cyclone and RHIB. Advanced navigation, radar, as well as radio and satellite 
communications complements these already versatile military craft.  
 
5. USCG Harbor Security and Motor Life-Boats (Mlb) 
 
Figure 9.   USCG Harbor Security Patrol Boats 
 
The United States Coast Guard maintains the constabulatory role in the US continental 
littorals. Furthermore, the USCG has expanded its role in maritime security since the 
events of September 11th. With its transfer to the Department of Homeland Security, the 
USCG has expanded its small boat inventory to enhance its mission capabilities. The 
USCG’s motor life boats (MLB), and other security boats are easily adaptable to modular 
C4ISR communications suites.   
 
Figure 10.   USCG Motor Life Boats (MLB)  
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6. Coalition Forces 
As stated previously, the sheer size of the Earth, combined with the fact that the 
globe is mostly covered by water, ensures that even combined, USN and USCG ships 
have little hope of providing continuous coverage of every nautical mile of blue water. 
By the same logic, US riverine and maritime security forces cannot cover all littoral and 
riverine theatres. The future of riverine and maritime security hinges on the various 
regional alliances to maintain security. 
CTF 150 is a coalition maritime security force which operates in the waterways of 
the Central Command (CENTCOM). CTF 150 is a composite force operating numerous 
naval vessels in order to maintain maritime security in the Persian Gulf. Under European 
Naval command, US forces routinely operate security missions throughout the region.  
MALSINDO (named for the Malaysian, Singapore, and Indonesian navies) 
patrols the Straits of Malacca. In 2004, in fear of maritime terrorism and growing piracy, 
ADM Fargo (PACOM) offered US Navy and Marine Corps support for patrols in the 
Straits90. Those patrols were accepted by Singapore, but firmly denounced by Indonesia 
and Malaysia, who desired to patrol their own territorial waterways91.  
 
 
Figure 11.   Indonesian Frigate patrolling the Straits of Malacca  
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The Indonesian Navy, despite opposing US forces patrolling the Straits of 
Malacca directly, has been receptive to information-sharing, to include the addition of US 
collection technology on their crafts92. The Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency 
(MMEA) is considering a near term partnership with the Naval Postgraduate School 
regarding technology initiatives which can be integrated into their emerging capabilities.  
 
7. Junk Force Craft 
In the Vietnam War, a large portion of the riverine force were “Junk Force” ships, 
commercial craft “deputized” to operate as interdiction patrol ships in conjunction with 
US and Vietnamese forces93. These forces greatly increased the number of ships 
available to patrolling forces.   
In the current QDR, the importance of allied countries “policing themselves” to 
counter the threats within their country is strongly emphasized94. Before fully 
interoperable maritime forces can be developed, interaction with US Forces in an 
advisory role must be developed. In many of these countries, the first vessels which will 
be available to these governments will be converted civilian craft. With a proper 
enhanced military communications suite, they can fulfill the roles of intelligence and 
supporting patrol craft. In other words, immediate action to quell the disorder in the 
country could be taken before US forces could be fully deployed into the theatre95.  
 
E. SUMMARY 
The requirements placed on the maritime security and riverine forces of the US 
multi-service small boat forces and their coalition counterparts, require a survivable, 
modular, secure, and manageable C4ISR network topology architecture. This topology 
must enhance the capability of their sensor-to shooter timeline across a layered global 
maritime domain.  
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III. MOBILE AD-HOC NETWORKING 
This thesis expands on the work of previous students at Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS). IEEE 802.16 technologies have been studied in the context of the USMC 
doctrine of Distributed Operations, Ship to Operational Maneuver (STOM), and USCG 
constabulatory missions in Homeland Security. Furthermore, the study of FLAKs in 
order to increase the modularity of communications has been initiated by Capt Dwayne 
Lancaster, USMC, in his thesis studying the importance of Fly-away kits for responses to 
humanitarian disasters.  
This research capitalizes on the efforts of these NPS graduates in order to apply 
these applications to C4ISR support in riverine warfare and maritime security.  
 
A. NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE (NCW) 
The Office of the Secretary of Defense describes Network-centric warfare (NCW) 
as an emerging theory of war in the Information Age96. The term encompasses the 
“combination of strategies, emerging tactics, techniques, procedure, and organizations 
that a fully, or even partially networked force can employ to create a decisive war-
fighting advantage97. This information advantage is that: 
NCW generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision 
makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of 
command, high tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased 
survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization. In essence, it translates 
information advantage into combat power by effectively linking friendly 
forces within the battle-space, providing a much improved shared 
awareness of the situation, enabling a more rapid and effective decision-
making at all levels of military operations, thereby allowing for increased 
speed of execution98. 
Although the term NCW has existed since 1998, the military formally adopted the 
concept into its Joint Vision 2020, when it established the key elements of a transformed 
networked force. The modern vision of NCW involves the network itself to be the  
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centerpiece of NCW, as opposed to the traditional legacy system platform-centric 
networks of military history. The key elements to be taken from the US military’s future 
adaptations of NCW are: 
• A robustly networked Force improves information sharing 
• Information sharing enhances the quality of information and shared 
situational awareness 
• Shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self-
synchronization, and enhances sustainability and speed of command99 
Current initiatives in the development of NCW forces have not been refined into a 
routable architecture.   
Although NCW has existed in a partial manner for some time in the USN, with its 
adaptations of JTIDS and GCCS-M, these technologies have been centered on the larger 
carrier based fleet deployments. Furthermore, these are not routable networks, and cannot 
be integrated into an internet to share data.  NCW has not extended down to remote users 
like small boat operators. Still, the long-term goal of all US forces is to be linked together 
in an internet that will collect, manage, and disseminate all data, to include targeting 
information, from every sensor to every shooter. The centerpiece of this accomplishment 
of NCW will be in the Global Information Grid (GIG).  
 
1. The Global Information Grid 
The GIG is the internet designed for the Department of Defense (DoD) and is 
defined as: 
The globally interconnected, end to end set of information capabilities, 
associated processes, and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, 
disseminating and managing information on demand to war-fighters, 
policy makers, and support personnel100.  
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Figure 12.   Network-Centric Warfare diagram of the Global Information Grid (GIG) 
 
In other words, all communications capabilities, personnel, and equipment related 
to the defense of the United States, whether utilized in peace or war, is to be integrated 
seamlessly into the GIG.  Tactical radios in the field to strategic intelligence satellites are 
all to become inter-operable. To make the goal slightly more complex, all coalition and 
allied forces, as well as non-DoD users and systems supporting the national security 
structure, must be integrated as well. In JV2020, the GIG is listed as the key to the future 
military’s “strategic agility” in information operations101. 
The Global Information Grid Bandwidth Expansion (GIG-BE) is a recent 
endeavor to increase the throughput of the GIG for all of the users. With the number of 
applications, processes, and users constantly increasing and lending pressure to the 
demands of real-time bandwidth, there has been a push to focus on increasing the number 
of bits which can be transferred between modular users. With Voice over Internet 
Protocols (VoIP), digital security IP cameras, higher Graphical Information Systems, and 
GPS, and greater numbers of users linked in, the need for increased bandwidth grows at 
an accelerated rate. 
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There are obstacles to fully achieving the GIG, and the most prominent is the 
difference in technologies adapted by the various militaries. The GIG is a DoD internet, 
and its focus is to pass data down to all services. Each military is working to link together 
their service-specific NCW endeavors to the GIG, much like the differing technologies 
utilized in the internet interoperate over similar protocols.  
The GIG is far from complete, and the end systems which will be implemented 
onto this DoD internet, requires specific measures in order to design the topology 
correctly. The strategy for the implementation of a GIG requires: 
• LAN 
• Terrestrial WAN 
• Radio-WAN 
• End-to-end security measures 
• End-to-end management 
• Next generation protocols102 
The application of these requirements will be addressed further, and re-visited as 
standards when the specific thesis technology is addressed later in the thesis.  
 
2. Usn/Usmc – FORCEnet 
FORCEnet will be the communications structure behind SeaPower 21, the 
triumvirate strategy for the transformation towards future naval operations. Sea Power 21 
entails Sea Strike, Sea Basing, and Sea Shield. Sea Strike entails the offensive 
capabilities while Sea Shield entails the defensive. Riverine and maritime security exists 
in both of these. Sea basing is focused on the support to the other two pillars of Sea 
Power 21.  
We often cite asymmetric challenges when referring to enemy threats, 
virtually assuming such advantages belong only to our adversaries. "Sea 
Power 21" is built on a foundation of American asymmetric strengths that 
are powerful and uniquely ours. Among others, these include the 
expanding power of computing, systems integration, a thriving industrial 
base, and the extraordinary capabilities of our people, whose innovative 
nature and desire to excel give us our greatest competitive advantage103.  
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The connecting glue of these three portions of Sea Power 21 and the three supporting 
portions will be FORCEnet.  
 
 
Figure 13.   FORCEnet 21 as an integrated composite of Sea Power 21 
 
FORCEnet is designed to be the NCW of the combined Navy-Marine Corps team, 
architecting warriors, sensors, command and control, platforms, and weapons into a 
networked, distributed combat force104.  
ForceNet will provide the architecture to increase substantially combat 
capabilities through aligned and integrated systems, functions, and 
missions. It will transform situational awareness, accelerate speed of 
decision, and allow us to greatly distribute combat power. ForceNet will 
harness information for knowledge-based combat operations and increase 
force survivability. It will also provide real-time enhanced collaborative 
planning among joint and coalition partners105. 
ForceNet Impact 
• Connected warriors, sensors, networks, command and control, platforms, and 
weapons  
• Accelerated speed and accuracy of decision  
• Integrated knowledge to dominate the battlespace  
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• Expeditionary, multi-tiered, sensor and weapons grids  
• Distributed, collaborative command and control  
• Dynamic, multi-path and survivable networks  
• Adaptive / automated decision aids  
• Human-centric integration  
 
"Sea Power 21" will be implemented by a Global Concept of Operations 
that will provide our nation with widely dispersed combat power from 
platforms possessing unprecedented warfighting capabilities. The global 
environment and our defense strategy call for a military with the ability to 
respond swiftly to a broad range of scenarios and defend the vital interests 
of the United States. We must dissuade, deter, and defeat both regional 
adversaries and transnational threats.  
The Global Concept of Operations will disperse combat striking power by 
creating additional independent operational groups capable of responding 
simultaneously around the world. This increase of combat power is 
possible because technological advancements are dramatically 
transforming the capability of our ships, submarines, and aircraft to act as 
power projection forces, netted together for expanded warfighting effect. 
The plan for FORCEnet is a smaller scale, yet comparable vision, to the goal of 
the GIG: an impact on distributed operations around the globe. This defines itself in the 
intended Global Concept of Operations to be implemented through the technology: 
• Widely distributed, fully netted striking power to support joint operations  
• Increased presence, enhanced flexibility, and improved responsiveness  
• Task-organized to deter forward, respond to crises, and win decisively  
This Global Concept of Operations fits well within the ideal of the GIG, and the multiple 
mission parameters which NCW is designed to achieve in the GWOT-operational multi-
mission capable naval forces. Unfortunately for the simplicity of this vision, it requires 
interoperability with other military, civilian, and law enforcement actors in the GIG, as 
well as outside of its architecture. 
This vision of the FORCEnet, since it will complement the missions of the 
National Fleet, must be defined alongside the Integrated Deepwater 21 System.  
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3. USCG – Deepwater 
The Integrated Deepwater System 21 (IDS) is the USCG’s answer to NCW. IDS 
is designed to provide the capability to:  
Harness the power of an interoperable network to improve in all mission 
areas – enabling distributed operations and the sharing of information 
quickly and seamlessly across a wide range of units. Improved intelligence 
capabilities are true force multipliers in acquiring higher levels of 
actionable intelligence information allow commanders to make better 
informed operational decisions, manage risk wisely, and employ forces 
more106. 
Much like FORCEnet, IDS-21 is a focused on an improvement of C4ISR equipment, 
networks, and doctrine in order to refine a sensor to shooter mesh, which can reduce 
the decision-makers time concerning adversaries in the maritime environment.  
 
 
Figure 14.   Deepwater Assets to be integrated into the full NCW architecture 
 
 
4. DIGITAL DIVIDE 
The “digital divide” is the division of communication assets at the strategic and 
operational level versus the tactical operator. The infantry soldier in the field is 
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disadvantaged in his ability to link to the new technologies which enable NCW. It is the 
“last mile” connection which has not been achieved through current networking 
capabilities in the military.  
 Currently, the US has substantial communications at the division and brigade 
level. For the Navy, this means adequate communications at the carrier and command 
ship level. For further connections to the dismounted infantryman or boarding officer, 
two steps must be accomplished.  
 The first step is to connect from the division/brigade level down to the last 
vehicle. This is the focus of current MANET research. The attempt to establish standard 
Radio-WANs through various technologies in order to enhance NCW in the military has 
been inconsistent and episodic at best. Various research initiatives have been 
implemented with the intention of linking these remote users, but none have been 
successful.  
The second step includes the connection from the brigade down to the company 
level down. Ashore, it is the dismounted infantryman. Afloat, it's the boarding officer that 
has stepped off his boat.  This represents both a major and minor problem.  The 
minor problem is to allow the network to function; the major problem will 
be to provide electrical power to the components that accompany the 
dismounted infantryman (current battery technology is too limited). 
Closing this digital divide is the primary goal of Mobile Ad-hoc Networking 
(MANET) research today in the military, as well as in the commercial world. It is to this 
disadvantaged user that the focus of the communications links in this thesis will focus.  
In a military sense, the digital divide exists primarily between the Major 
Subordinate Commands (MSC) and the small maneuvering forces which operate OTH 
and NLOS. For the maritime environment, these include riverine operators, small boats 
conducting VBSS, and maritime security missions. These on the move operators have 
been separated from the military communications architecture by systems deficiencies 





B. MOBILE AD-HOC NETWORKING (MANET) 
A MANET is a self-configuring network of mobile routers (and associated hosts) 
connected by wireless links—the union of which form an arbitrary topology107. 
MANETs are devised to require minimal configuration, be quickly deployable, and 
suitable for emergency situations like humanitarian disasters. MANETs can be operated 
in conjunction with the internet, or as a stand-alone network108.  
In recent years, with the advent of IEEE 802.11 ad-hoc networking, networks 
without wireless access points (WAP) have been adapted into MANET research studies. 
This has enlarged the techniques of the adaptations of new standards of wireless 
transmission. 
Current deployed MANETs in the military include the Joint Tactical Radio 
System (JTRS) and the Near Term Digital Radio (NTDR). JTRS is a joint US-NATO 
research project on the development of software-defined radios (SDR). JTRS is a layer 3 
solution and operates within the routers. Meanwhile, NTDR is the US Army’s MANET 
for disadvantaged operators in ground warfare. JTRS is the current standard in military 
MANET research, attempting to culminate ground, airborne, and maritime radios with 
multiple waveforms operating on each radio109.  
MANET research has been devised from many different directions. Some schools 
of thought have focused on adapting digital / analog data transformers to take advantage 
of digital bandwidths and analog RF propagation. Other avenues of thought have worked 
within the IEEE digital transmission standards, adapting wireless networking technology 
to tactical applications. Both of these directions have their advantages. The following 
recommendations are based upon lessons learned in MANET technologies.  
MANET must be architecture-oriented. In other words, design of the network 
infrastructure should come before any focus should be placed on the secondary systems 
on the network. “All information systems are made up of sense, decide, and act end 
                                                 
107 Downloaded from www.wikipedia.org on April 25, 2006 
108 Setting up a stand-alone network in NCW would be pointless, despite the capability existing with 
the technology. 
109 www.globalsecurity.org/JTRS/  Comparisons in previous research have used JTRS as the 
benchmark for comparison of the capabilities of 802.16 networks in previous thesis conducted at NPS. This 
study will not focus on this study in a any more depth. This thesis will expand on the superiority of 802.16 
network topologies over the JTRS model of network architecture. 
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nodes” and the internet which connects them together. End systems are not connected to 
each other, but instead to a system within the platform110. This is accomplished in a 
LAN by a router. Therefore, a simple design adjustment to a network requires only a 
router re-programming.  
 
The seven layer OSI model of network architecture is a standard applied to all 




Figure 15.   MANET Architecture versus the OSI model architecture 
 
  The future of MANET in the military should revolve around the application of 
these rules to the design of any future architecture. Fortunately, commercial standards 
concerning the implementation of parameters like this have already been built into 
commercial wireless network protocols.  
 Two basic architecture principles must be integrated into any MANET design. 
The first principle is the Platform-Level LAN. This means that all end systems on the 
network are connected to the platform’s LAN. Another way to interpret this is as follows: 
All information systems are made up of sense, decide, and act end nodes (known as end 
systems in internet-speak), and the network that connects them together. Complexity is 
simply these same elements together with nesting and chaining.112 
                                                 
110 Buddenberg – “A Perspective on Mobile Communications” Dec 2005 
111 Douglas Comer, p. 48 
112 Buddenburg, “Objective, Architecture and Strategy for Network-Centric: A Perspective on Mobile 









This means that every periphery technology will only speak to the LAN, and require a 




Figure 16.   Information System Principle #1 
 
Since the LAN maintains the connectivity between the end systems, they do not connect 
to anything outside of the platform. They are connected to other platforms through the 
router on the LAN. This is where the second principle of MANET architecture becomes 
important. 
The second principle of MANET architecture is the WAN, where both radio and 
terrestrial, can be viewed as a cloud with routers at the border113. It is important to note 
that this is the overarching architecture planned for the full integration of the GIG-BE, 
where router links between periphery technologies will connect through routers on 
platform oriented LANs. 
 
                                                 




Figure 17.   Information System Principle #2 
  
Currently, a COTS communications technology exists which could fulfill the role 
of linking mobile military units in this manner. With a focus on the Layer 1 and 2 
sections of the OSI model, it would fulfill the linkage between platform-centric LANs 
with end systems114, as well as function as the Radio-WAN routable network between 
these platform-centric LANs115. 
 
C. IEEE 802.16  116 
1. IEEE 802.16 Background 
IEEE 802.16 is a wireless networking standard published by the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)117. Its purpose is to provide low-cost 
compatible and interoperable standards for the design of broadband wireless equipment 
                                                 
114 Ibid,, MANET Principle #1 
115 Ibid, MANET Principle #2 
116 A significantly more in-depth study of 802.16 was completed at NPS by USMC Captains: Robert 
Guice and Robert Munoz in their thesis: “IEEE 802.16 Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) Technologies as 
a complement to Objective Maneuver (STOM) Communications” September 2004. If more information is 
required concerning the specific parameters of 802.16, this thesis will cover all the networking specifics 
while this thesis will focus on modular topology implementations. 
117 The actual title for the IEE standard is “Air Interface for Fixed Broadband Wireless Access 
Systems” 
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and operations as an alternate to cable and Digital Subscriber lines (DSL)118. The IEEE 
802.16 standard was approved on December 6, 2001, and provides the standard to 
frequencies between the 10 and 66 GHz range. The IEEE 802.16a standard was approved 
on April 9, 2002, the standard establishes “first mile/last mile” standards for connecting 
metropolitan broadband wireless, and is focused in the 2-11 GHz range.  
WiFi (wireless fidelity – IEEE 802.11) has a much smaller footprint119, an 
unstable media access algorithm and has difficulty propagating in metropolitan areas, 
IEEE 802.16  is an ideal much choice for establishing links between the wireless clouds 
established for client access120. Since IEEE 802.16 networks support up to 50 Mbps, and 
allow for the simultaneous transfer of data, voice, and video, sustained data rates of 
almost .5 to 2 Mbps can be provided to multiple users121. IEEE 802.11 components will 
still be used for client connectivity in this thesis, due to the limited number of client IEEE 
802.16 technology on the COTS market today. Long-term focus will be on the total IEEE 
802.16 M-FLAK package.  
The IEEE 802.16 standard specifies a Media Access Control (MAC) layer 
designed for the support of multiple Physical Layers (PHY) in order to operate in many 
environments. The robust bandwidth of IEEE 802.16 enables thousands of DSL-size 
subscribers to be maintained on the MAC. IEEE 802.16 was designed to operate with 
both point to point (PtP) and point to multi-point (PtMP) network topologies.  
The IEEE 802.16 also standards provide: 
• Long range connectivity up to 30 miles 
• Non Line of sight (NLOS) performance 
• Multi-path operations 
• Scalability 
                                                 
118 http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/802/16/pub/backgrounder.html - Broadband Wireless Access: An 
Introduction to the Technology Behind the IEEE 802.16 WirelessMAN™ Standard. Other models for the 
application of 802.16 include an architecture which links the Radio-WAN directly into the client hardware.  
119 A few hundred meters depending on commercial access point and industry standard utilized 
120 802.11 also have limited security capabilities and operates primarily on Carrier Sense Multiple 
Access – Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA), which does not enable a scalable increase to larger numbers of 
users. Only later revisions of the 802.11 standards (802.11a and 802.11g) added the OFDM capability to its 
standards.  
121 Downloaded from Epicon 
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• Quality of Service (QoS) support to voice and video applications 
• Routable networks within the 802 framework 
• Multicast traffic support  
 
The NLOS capabilities are due to the orthogonal frequency division multiplexing 
(OFDM) functionality of the IEEE 802.16 standards122. OFDM is described as 
a spread spectrum technique that distributes the data over a large number 
of carriers that are spaced apart at precise frequencies. This spacing 
provides the orthogonality in this technique which prevents the 
demodulators from seeing frequencies other than their own. The benefits 
of OFDM are high spectral frequency, resiliency to RF interference, and 
lower multi-path distortion123. 
IEEE 802.16 is also commonly referred to as WiMAX, the Worldwide 
Operability for Microwave Access. WiMAX is actually a business organization which 
has adopted various certifications within the IEEE 802.16 business community. WiMAX 
currently serves hotspots and wireless local area networks all over the globe. Current 
WiMAX companies include Motorola, Redline Communications, Intel, Fujitsu, and AT 
& T, ever-expanding the COTS research, and therefore products, which can integrated in 
a cost-effective manner124. Considerable research has been undertaken by all of these 
companies in the expansion of this technology standard to the mobile user. 
 
2. Military Applications of IEEE 802.16  
IEEE 802.16 standards have been growing in popularity among military operators 
for deployable applications. Currently, IEEE 802.16 topologies have been deployed to 
Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and Afghanistan in order to support networking insufficiencies 
in deployed combat units. The IEEE 802.16 equipment has been deployed to future 
applications of JTRS radios and represents yet another potential area for the adoption of 
IEEE 802.16 standards125.   
                                                 
122 http://www.standards.ieee.org/getieee802/802.16.html   
123 OFDM Tutorial http://www.wave-report.com/tutorials/OFDM.htm Last downloaded on May 26, 
2006 
124 www.wimaxforum.org – there are currently over 200 companies in the WiMAX Forum  
125 Downloaded from Epicon 
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 JTRS utilizes a software-defined radio (SDR), which uses software for the 
demodulation and modulation of radio signals. JTRS is planned for integration into the 
GIG, will reduce the number of traditional radios in the field from 750,000 to 250,000, 
and shift with the concept of true NCW for the military, it is not built to upgrade with the 
acceleration of technology126. JTRS is not a modular system like IEEE 802.16 topology 
networks, and therefore is not easily upgradeable127. The expansion of JTRS from its 
current topology will include extensive integration, and require millions of dollars in 
software programming and architecture restructuring.   
 There are considerable obstacles to be overcome before JTRS can be fully 
deployed to operators in the field to fulfill all of the necessary requirements of a 
functional and secure MANET. This is an especially true in an expanding mission area 
such as the maritime security and riverine environments.  
IEEE 802.16 equipment has been deployed to various theaters in the GWOT. Iraq 
and Afghanistan both have US Army and Marine Corps communications suites being 
operated for numerous missions in these combat theatres. This has been to handle the step 
of Division to Brigade, as well as Brigade to Company communications links. 
Unfortunately, the extension of these technologies has not been re-distributed to the 
disadvantaged operator across the digital divide.  This precedence, and the success of the 
equipment in the field, firmly establishes the functionality of these technologies in 
adverse conditions. With further expansion of these technologies, the success of the 
scalability of these network architectures would be unprecedented.  
 
3. IEEE 802.16e 
IEEE 802.16e, also known as mobile WiMAX, was adopted as a standard by the 
IEEE on December 2005. The main capability of the IEEE 802.16e standard will be the 
“meshing capability” which will connect Base Stations (BS) and Subscriber Stations (SS) 
together through layer 2 protocols. This will enable the mesh capabilities of certain 
802.11 WiFi networking gear to be applied to the IEEE 802.16 standard.  
                                                 
126 Munoz, p. 14 
127 www.globalsecurity.org/JTRS/   
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By improving on facets of fixed position IEEE 802.16 standards from OFDM to 
OFDMA, a multi-user expansion of the protocol, the ability of mobile users to maintain 
connectivity will be greatly improved128. A new expansion of the OFDM-256 protocol 
used by fixed position IEEE 802.16 technologies is planned also, known as SOFDMA, or 
Scalable Orthogonal Frequency Divisional Multiplexing Access.   
SOFDMA will improve upon OFDM256 for NLOS applications by: 
• Improving NLOS coverage by utilizing advanced antenna diversity schemes, and 
hybrid-Automatic Retransmission Request (HARQ)  
• Increasing system gain by use of denser sub-channelization, thereby improving 
indoor penetration 
• Introducing high-performance coding techniques such as Turbo Coding and Low-
Density Parity Check (LDPC), enhancing security and NLOS performance  
• Introducing downlink sub-channelization, allowing administrators to trade 
coverage for capacity or vice versa  
• Improving coverage by introducing Adaptive Antenna Systems (AAS) and 
Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) technology  
• Eliminating channel bandwidth dependencies on sub-carrier spacing, allowing for 
equal performance under any RF channel spacing (1.25-14 MHz)  
• Enhanced Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) algorithm can tolerate larger delay 
spreads, increasing resistance to multi-path interference  
 
New technological components are planned for release in 2006, and SOFDMA is 
the planned software application to enhance IEEE 802.16e capabilities. Unfortunately, 
SOFDMA is not compatible with OFDM-256. Still, current manufacturers of OFDM-256 
are currently planning migration paths in order to compensate for this transition.  
This adaptation will enable current network topologies which include IEEE 
802.16a to be easily upgraded to IEEE 802.16e standard technologies. Upgrades to 
network architecture would simply require the addition of new Radio-WAN modules as 
they passed established standards.  
 
 
                                                 
128 www.wikipedia.org 
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D MARITIME NETWORK TOPOLOGIES FOR IEEE 802.16 
ARCHITECTURES 
The Quadrennial Defense Report, published in 2005, highlighted the importance 
of interoperable communications in maritime security today. It specifically stated: 
 
• Architectural design solution for the mobile communications needs of multi-
mission capable small boats 
•  Routable, secure, modular, interoperable system of communications which can 
be used by multi-language military, constabulatory, and rescue forces both abroad 
and domestically  
•  Interoperable communications with non-governmental support as a capability129  
 
The following topologies will establish the multi-mission capabilities of the 
maritime FLAK as a C4ISR tool to counter asymmetric threats. These multiple missions 
will highlight the versatility of the M-FLAK in the required mission parameters. Each of 
these topologies is based on the MANET principles #1 and #2 as explained earlier.  
 
1. VBSS Topology 
This topology establishes numerous platform-centric M-FLAK suites, which 
could link to each other, or connect from remote tactical locations to strategic and 
operational command nodes via a SAT-COM link. Each one of these units will maintain 
the platform-centric LAN with end systems, while each link will be the Radio-WAN 
IEEE 802.16  connection which can then be routed through the overarching GIG-BE 
architecture.  
 




Figure 18.   VBSS Network Topology for the M-FLAK 
 
 
2. Riverine – Craft to Craft & Craft to Shore (Vehicle or Choke Point 
Security) 
The following topology will build on the arguments formulated in the previous 
section, but will add another routable connection through a SAT-COM link. This will 
enable the remote riverine operator to maintain connectivity despite the extreme distances 
experienced by these operations. Because the C2 HUMVEE will maintain the same 
platform-centric LAN, the overall Radio-WAN links will be the same as the boat-to-






Figure 19.   Riverine M-FLAK Topology  
 
 
3. Harbor & Port Security 
The harbor security topology reflects the easiest to implement since the distances 
required will be much less than the Riverine and Open Sea VBSS topologies. Also, the 
power levels on the shore arrays are easier to maintain. The same VBSS connectivity will 
be able to be maintained as ships are interdicted.  
The harbor security topology matches the existing geography of the USCG UHF-
FM high site system, which uses analog voice. This system provides port and coastal 
communications throughout the US. Essentially, an IEEE 802.16 Radio-Wan technology 




















IV. MARITIME FLY AWAY KIT TECHNOLOGY  
A. M-FLAK TOPOLOGY 
 The basic architecture for the M-FLAK will be based on the same concepts as the 
MANET requirements for effectiveness. It will be modular, scalable, interoperable, 
secure and manageable end-to-end. The technology below will be explained in two 
sections. The first are the networking components which function within the MANET 
architecture as explained in the last chapter. The second are the end systems which are 









Figure 21 contains the M-FLAK components which will be placed on the small 
boat. The Kestrel camera and Patrolcam are linked into the architecture using 
technologies which convert their signal130 into a networked signal which can be 
transferred over the LAN and WAN. For this reason, their position is not the same as the 
other end systems.  
Figure 22 establishes the link between the multiple LANs around the globe, which 
can then send, receive, and view data from the various end systems operated by the 
remote users.  
 
PtMP AN-50s link the separate 
routers, operating like a cloud of 
connections to LANs where various 
end systems can collect, receive and 
send data over the total network.
The TOC TCK router collects 
and forwards data to other 
routers around the globe 
through a tunneled VPN in the 
internet. 




Fusion Center – Alameda, 
CA
IIFC – Chiang Mai, 
Thailand
 






                                                 
130 Analog signal in the case of the Patrolcam and Digital, but not IP, in with the Kestrel Camera.  
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1. Network Components 
a. Redline AN-50e Communications Bridge 
The “Master” station to be used in the maritime network topology is the 
Redline Communications AN-50e Point-to-Multi-point (PtMP) Base Station (BS). As a 
Point-to-point wireless communications suite, the AN-50 is capable of passing NLOS 
broadband signals at 54 Mbps at a distance of 30 kilometers (km). In PtMP mode, the BS 
is able to pass as much as 35 Mbps over distances of 15km.  
Two different configurations are planned for the shore based antenna 
array. One entails an AN-50e in a PtMP mode. The second configuration entails one AN-
50e for each antenna in the array. Both were tested, and both showed various advantages. 
Most of the considerations for implementations will revolve around the costs associated 
with the different topologies.  
 
 
Figure 23.   AN-50e Wireless Base Station  
 
 
b. Redline AN-50M Communications Bridge 
The AN-50M is the man-portable version of the AN-50e wireless 
networking bridge. The AN-50M will be used in the maritime FLAK as the mobile 
bridge. Depending on range, using the PtMP mode, bandwidth has been passed as high as 
35 Mbps with the higher-level firmware software additions. On the standard firmware 
levels, 15 Mbps is passed from unit to multiple units.  
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Figure 24.   AN-50M Wireless Base Station  
 
c. Hyperlink Sectored 360 degree Omni-array  
The 5.8 GHz omni-directional sector antenna arrays include four 17 dBi, 
90 degree, sectored antennas produced by Hyperlink Technologies, Inc.  
 
 
Figure 25.    Hypergain HG5817P-090 Wifi antenna array   
 
Each sector antenna is a Hypergain HG5817P-090 WI-FI antenna. Each 




conjunction with the 90 degree horizontal beam width. A four-way splitter connects the 
four antennas together to the AN-50e bridges. The RF pattern resulting from this antenna 
configuration is as follows: 
 
Figure 26.   RF Propagation form the Sectored Omni Array  
  
Each sector antennas of the individually-fed array will have RF 
propagation as follows: 
 
Figure 27.   RF Propagation from the Sectored antenna  
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The horizontal beam-width of the antennas, which combines four 90 
degree sectors into a full omni-directional array, is balanced with a nine degree vertical 
beam-width. This requires the shore antenna arrays and the sea-based antenna arrays to 
be placed at comparable heights.   
In order to test alternate antenna configurations, a 5.8 GHz antenna array 
using four 13 dBi, 90 degree sector antennas, with a smaller “sail-area” to compensate for 
configuration ergonomics, was utilized in the March 2006 NPS COASTS field 
experiment in Thailand.  
 
Figure 28.   Superpass 13 dbi antenna   
 
d. D-Link Commercial Ethernet Switch 
Switch: In order to increase the client technology available to the modular 
kit, an eight-port switch to connect the Modular PC, ACK box, and the IEEE 802.11g 
wireless access point to the IEEE 802.16 AN-50M base station in the M-FLAK. Also, 
other client technologies can be directly linked into the Switch. 
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Figure 29.   D-link four-port Ethernet Switch    
 
e. AKCP Sensor Probe Eight Linux (SP8L)  
AKCP Sensor Probe 8 Linux (SP8L): The AKCP Sensor Probe 8 Linux 
“black box” is a Linux programmed network tool which enables non-IP sensors to be 
linked into a TCP/IP protocol network. This capability will be vital for coalition allies 
who have invested in other proprietary security network technologies because it enables 
these technologies to be integrated into the full network, assigning them IP addresses in 
its Linux server. Even traditional stereo AV cable-fed sensor inputs will be able to be 
viewed across the network architecture, no matter the distance.  
The addition of the AKCP box enables the proprietary equipment utilized 
in the M-FLAK to become “good citizen” technology131. This means they are able to talk 
to other network gear on the principle #1 LAN. Even more important, they are routable to 
other platforms. Like the second principle in the MANET requirements, this enables the 
transfer of packetized data throughout the devised networks.  
                                                 
131 Buddenberg, Good Citizen Technology 
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Figure 30.   AKCP SP8L Box – Front View      
 
For the maritime FLAK, the SP8L, a standard rack-mounted black box was placed in the 
roto-roll SKB cases along with the AN-50M. The rear opening of the SKB case enabled 
any non-traditional sensor cables to be easily linked into the box. 
 
Figure 31.   AKCP SP8L Box – Back View       
69 
The SP8L has eight RJ-45 configurable sensor ports, can work with any 
type of current operating systems, a 32-bit ARM processor, 64 MB of SDRAM, and 128 
Megabytes of volatile FLASH memory. The SP8L can connect up to four cameras, which 
means two cameras can be added to the current topology.  
The SP8L utilizes SNMP, an important requirement for end-to-end 
management. The important factor to understand here is that the AKCP box is one of the 
components which turns peripheral technologies into the proverbial “good citizens”. 
 
2. M- FLAK End Systems  
According to the requirements of an establishing a MANET: 
The apex of information systems architecture is the interface that defines 
how end systems (the sense, decide and act modules) attach to the 
supporting internet-work. End systems can be easily attached to an 
internet … providing that these end systems qualify as Good Network 
Citizens.132 
This means that any end system attached to a LAN, as defined by the Information System 
requirement in principle #1, must be able to transmit data through the network and over 
the combined network topology. This concept entails the idea that even a toaster can be 
connected to the internet as long as it has the capability to speak to other components 
through Layer 3 protocols.  
 Many of the following technologies added to the M-FLAK are not “good 
citizens,” but can be made good citizens through the addition of the AKCP SP8L box.  
 
a. Kestrel-Tech wearable USB Camera 
Kestrel wearable USB powered camera: Attached to the Modular PC, 
which enables the dual role of a functional computer for the small boat operator, as well 
as a portable, wearable, and ergonomic computer for members of the boarding team. 




                                                 
132 Buddenburg, p. 1, “Of Good Network Citizens and Internet Toasters.” Feb 2000 
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Situational Awareness (SSA) application to view and control the camera’s view. In the 
current testing topology, the Kestrel camera will be fed through the network by a web-
server application133.  
 
 
Figure 32.   Kestrel-Tech USB Powered Camera worn by LT Hochstedler in Thailand 
 
 
b. Modular Computing Company’s (MCC) Modular PC 
Modular PC Computer: The computer system utilized in the M-FLAK is 
the Modular PC system designed and created by the Modular Computer Corporation 
(MCC). The Modular PC is a ruggedized computer which can be shifted from various 
input and output housing modules. This makes the Modular PC ideal for tactical 
situations since it can be used in different modules depending on the mission while still 
maintaining powerful processing speed.    
 
 
                                                 
133 The Software video application used for this testing was Webcam XP 
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Modular PC specifications: 
• 30 GB Hard Drive 
• 1 GHz Processor 
• Windows XP  
• 512 MB RAM  
• 6.3 Display Screen (Daylight Readable Screen)  
• Extended Long-life battery to 5.5 hours 





Figure 33.   Modular PC     
 
c. Patrolcam 
Patrolcam: The primary camera to be utilized in the FLAK is the 
Patrolcam. The Patrolcam is a heavy-duty, outdoor, security camera designed for mobile 
units. Originally designed for Police, SWAT, fire, and inspection vehicles in the United 
States, the camera has a nitrogen-encased lens to prevent fogging, a solid aluminum 
casing for survivability, and image stabilization to maintain an anti-jitter video feeds 
during erratic motion. These features make it the ideal camera for the rough water 
movement of small boats across water. 
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The camera also possesses a Near Infrared capability, making the unit 
functional as an ISR tool in the day as well as the night. Since the Patrolcam is a 
proprietary technology, and not an IP camera, the Patrolcam will be linked via an AKCP 
video processor, which links the video feed from the camera to any location on the 
network.  
Camera Specifications: 
• 25X Optical / 12X Digital Zoom 
• 5.5” Readout screen 
• Standardized Thule Roof Rack 
  
  
Figure 34.   Patrolcam and Proprietary joystick      
 
3. Miscellaneous M-FLAK Equipment 
a. SKB Roll-Shock Case 
SKB Case: In the construction of the M-FLAK, a roll shock case produced 
by SKB cases was used. SKB Inc. produces military standard (MIL-STD) cases for 
multiple applications. A 6-rack deep roll-shock was chosen for the FLAK design because 
all necessary electronics equipment can be hard-mounted within the case. Also, the 




Figure 35.   SKB Roll Shock Case 6R 
 
b. Power 
The UB 2590 Battery is the current power source for the AN-50M bridge. 
Two batteries power each AN-50M for almost seven hours of continuous operations.  
  
 
Figure 36.   UB2590 And 12 volt batteries        
 
Also, in order to power the Switch, Patrolcam, and ACK, twelve volt 
automobile batteries, and a DC to AC inverter, were used to maintain power. These 
batteries powered the switch, SP8L, and the Patrolcam. The shore arrays and AN-50e 
were powered by AC power in the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) - this is the physical 
location where all other aspects of the network, to include the various MANET 
requirements established in the previous chapter, are connected into an interoperable SSA 
for watch-stander use..  
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4. Miscellaneous Network Equipment 
Miscellaneous Network Equipment contributed by the Coalition Operating Area 
Surveillance and Targeting System (COASTS) research project. Various cables were 
used to connect the maritime FLAK components: ethernet cables, cross-over cables, and 
input components. Also, certain software and networking applications contributed to the 
testing of the M-FLAK. These technologies are examples of the NCA applications which 
will be employed by the various service-centric network architectures.  
  
a. C3Trak Shared Situational Application (SSA) 
C3Trak is a joint corporate/NPS student software SSA which fuses the 
collective data of the network sensors into a collaborative graphical user interface (GUI). 
C3Trak is designed to produce a graphical representation of all sensor data, over a 3D 
topographic representation much like Google Earth. Icons were placed in order to enable 
operators to “point and click” the 3D ICONS, and be able to produce video and data 
without a need for language translations. As a tool for further integrating the multi-
language multi-nation coalition operations of the future, applications similar to C3Trak 
will be vital. These same types of applications will be necessary in order to break through 





Figure 37.   Shared Situation Awareness (SSA) applications C3 Track         
 
 
b. 802.11g Mesh Dynamics Access Point 
 
 
Figure 38.   IEEE 802.11g Mesh Dynamics Wireless Access Point (AP) 
 
 
The IEEE 802.11g wireless access point will establish connectivity from the small 
boat to the boarded ship. This will enable the utility of the Modular PC, the Kestrel  
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camera, as well as other associated biometric client applications to extend beyond the 
maritime craft to other vessels. This radio will operate in the 2.4 GHz frequency range 
using a 400mWatt radio.  
 




Figure 39.   Identix Biometrics Reader  
 
The Identix corporation biometric reader enabled fingerprints, photos, and 
biometric profile data to be recorded, and then sent, via the FLAK to the portable SAT-
COM connections, and back to the various intelligence fusion centers for comparison. 
The IBIS reader takes photographs and fingerprints from suspects and transmits the data 
over a wireless connection to a remote, updateable database.  
This database can be linked into larger biometrics databases, enabling the 
remote operator to update and reference larger levels of constabulatory data than before.  
 
d. Air Force Battle Lab (AFBL) Explosive Material Device  
The AFBL is currently conducting testing with a COTS explosive analysis 
device which works much like a breathalyzer does for drunken driving stops in the US. 
This device detects residue chemicals up to ten days after an individual has been exposed 
77 
to them. With the addition of this device to the M-FLAK, the detection of the users, 
creators, and transporters of improvised explosive devices (IED) can be extended to 
maritime forces around the globe. Although this modular and portable unit does not have 
the networking capability of the IBIS, it is a key way to supplement the biometrics data 





Figure 40.   AFBL Explosive Materials Detection Device   
 




Figure 41.   Tactical Communications Kit (TCK)   
 
The CISCO Tactical Communications Kit (TCK) includes the following 
equipment: 
• CISCO 2811 Router 
• VOIP Call Manager 
• AC/DC Power Inverter 
 
For the purpose of the COASTS 2006 experiment, the TCK was used to 
show VoIP capabilities, a mobile routing system, and the modularity of total 
communications systems for multi-mission capabilities. Donated by CISCO for 
experimentation immediately after NPS’s deployment of a Hastily Formed Network 
(HFN) to Hurricane Katrina relief efforts in coastal Mississippi, the TCK is built to 
overcome stove-piped communications capabilities among military, law enforcement, 





B. COMBINED M-FLAK  
1. Small Boat 
 Once all of these components are integrated in the M-FLAK, the modular design 
for the “last mile” tactical operator is achieved. The reduced footprint is vital due to the 
need for this equipment to be commercial airline transportable, as well as reasonable to 
transport on smaller riverine craft.  
 
 
Figure 42.   M-FLAK on the Speedboat during the May 2006 COASTS deployment   
 
2. Boarding Officer 
The composite boarding portion of the kits will culminate in the wearable 
Modular PC and the Kestrel camera. The link between these modules and the M-FLAK 
on the boat will be maintained by a link over an IEEE 802.11g encrypted wireless 
connection. Using a COTS software application known as Webcam XP, the video feed is 
turned into an IP broadcast across the network much like the AKCP SP8L converts the 
proprietary feed from the Patrolcam to the network from the M-FLAK.  
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Figure 43.   LT Hochstedler in the Boarding Officer gear using Kestrel Camera and 














V. LABORATORY AND FIELD EXPERIMENTATION 
The field and laboratory experimentation for this thesis spans seven months. This 
experimentation focused on studying the weaknesses and strengths of the maritime 
FLAK, and its ability to fulfill the QDR requirements for distributed network architecture 
in coalition littoral and riverine environments.  
 
 




A. COALITION OPERATING AREA SURVEILLANCE AND TARGETING 
SYSTEM (COASTS) EXPERIMENTS 
1.  Background 
The COASTS field experiment is an on-going research project based at the NPS. 
The COASTS field experimentation program supports U.S. Pacific Command 
(USPACOM), Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-W), Joint U.S. Military 
Advisory Group Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI), U.S. Special Operations Command 





Research & Development Office (DRDO) science and technology research requirements 
relating to theater and national security, counter-drug and law enforcement missions, and 
the Global War On Terror (GWOT)134.   
The COASTS program was designed to integrate the technological expertise of 
NPS’s education and research resources with the science and technology (and potential 
operational requirements) of the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) using WLAN 
technologies to fuse and to display information from air and ground sensors to a real-
time, multi-level, coalition enabled command and control center.  Using COTS 
technologies, the COASTS research program intended to demonstrate the capacity of 
coalition communications in an operational context.  
In 2005, the COASTS program completed a successful deployment of COTS 
NCW technologies in a tactical field deployment in Lop Buri, Thailand. The deployment 
included: integrated sensors, 802.11b WiFi, portable SAT-COM units, IEEE 802.16  PtP, 
UAVs, Deny GPS units, and SSA technologies. All of these were integrated into a system 
of systems for tactical deployment in a land-oriented counter-narcotic operational 
scenario. Based on the successful technologies from the 2005 deployments, an expanded 
2006 deployment to the Mae Ngat Dam, 60 kilometers north of Chiang Mai, Thailand 
was implemented.  
 
2.  Network Architecture 
The network that was designed for COASTS 2006 supported real-time video, 
integrated sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles, and situational awareness tools from 802.11 
a/g mesh and IEEE 802.16  PtMP devices. The backbone link of IEEE 802.16 point-to- 
point suites was used to link the RTAF Wing 411 communications station to the Royal 
Thai Army (RTA) Inter-agency Intelligence Fusion Center (IIFC) and to the Mae Ngat 
Dam area of operations (AO). 
At the Mae Ngat Dam AO, various sensors were integrated into this “system of 
systems” to create an “unblinking eye” of a tactical coalition C4ISR network architecture. 
In an IEEE 802.11g mesh WiFi cloud, various sensors and clients were integrated into the 
                                                 
134 COASTS 2006 CONOPS 
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network. Ultra-wide band sensors, IP cameras, UAVs, as well as various client 
applications and hardware, were enabled through the network.   
The COASTS’ “last mile” technology linked through the IEEE 802.16a backbone 
to the RTAF Headquarters, the IIFC, and the SAT-COM communications capabilities 
from the Wing 411 communications station to the Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center 
(MIFC) in Alameda, CA. This last satellite link also established the ability of numerous 
global databases being linked through a virtual private network (VPN) to a distributed 



















Figure 45.   COASTS Mae Ngat Dam Operating Area (AO) 
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Figure 40 represents the COASTS 2006 network diagram as well as the IEEE 
802.16a reach-back to the various intelligence fusion centers. The crucial elements of the 
network topology are as follows:  
• IEEE 802.11 b Distributed Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) 
• IEEE 802.11a/g Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) 
• IEEE 802.16  OFDM (Stationary) 
• IEEE 802.16  OFDM (Mobile) 
• SATCOM 
• Situational Awareness Overlay Software 
• Wearable Computing Devices 
• Air, Ground, and Water Integrated Sensors 
• Mobile C2 Platforms 
• Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) (Fixed wing) 
• UAVs (Rotary wing) 
• Unmanned Multi-environment micro vehicles  
• Ultra-wide Band Integrated Sensors 
• Deny-GPS Inertial Gyro technology  
• Network Security Applications 
• Compression software applications 
• Biometrics applications 
 
Extending from the Mae Ngat Dam AO, a multi-hop IEEE 802.16a link connected the 
regional counter-narcotic IIFC in Chiang Mai city. Satellite links and VPN tunneling 
through the commercial internet provided a secure throughput to the global MIFC in 
Alameda, CA, as well as a regional “strategic” command center (simulated at the Naval 




Figure 46.   COASTS 2006 Global Network Topology 
 
The breakdown of the overall COASTS 2006 network in a component diagram 
establishes the technological components used to establish the links across the geographic 
positions in Northern Thailand, as well as across the Pacific Ocean. 
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Figure 47.   Overall Mae Ngat Dam Network Topology  
 
The maritime component of the COASTS 2006 network topology is where the 
combined M-FLAK was evaluated. The COASTS 2006 scenario established the 
framework where the technological portions of the M-FLAK were field tested, as well as 
the numerous MOEs established earlier in this thesis.  
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with the maritime Fly-
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Control (C2) Center/HQ – Equipped 
with an 802.16 OFDM omni-
directional antenna. Shore based 
Fusion Center or Command and 
Center can be linked back to HHQ via 
SATCOM or further 802.16 OFDM 
point-to-point links.  
Figure 48.   COASTS 2006 Maritime Network Topology 
 
Although the maritime tests were a small portion of the overall COASTS 2006 
network topology, it provided significant qualitative and quantitative measurements of 
the performance levels of the M-FLAK and its components. 
  
3. Measures of Performance (MOP) 
The COASTS exercise scenario provided an operational context in which to test 
the qualitative measurements of the capabilities of the maritime FLAK. The ability to 
maintain a solid persistent connection - while operating at speeds of 20 to 25 knots - was 
deemed the most significant gauge of performance. The separate components in the M-
FLAK were studied concerning their own levels of performance. 
The Kestrel camera and the Patrolcam were measured by their ability to transfer 
real-time video feeds to the Tactical Operations Center (TOC). The speed of the packets 
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to be transferred from the TOC to the Monterey MIFC was also evaluated. The Patrolcam 
was analyzed individually concerning its ability to send anti-jitter video feeds while 
moving at high speeds. The tests of the Patrolcam also relied heavily upon the 
performance of the AKCP SP8L boxes.  
The ability of the SP8L to convert analog signals into digital TCP/IP packetized 
data was the deciding factor in whether the Patrolcam could remain as an integrated 
portion of the M-FLAK. Since the Patrolcam is a proprietary technology without a 
TCP/IP capability, this prevents the camera from being fully integrated into a networked 
system. The success of the SP8L will establish whether non-digital technologies can 
remain as a portion of coalition inventories working with modern network-centric US 
forces.  
Other component technologies have been tested in various commercial and 
military applications, so exact performance measures are not necessary. The performance 
of these components will be analyzed in the context of the overall performance relative to 
the M-FLAK135. 
 
4. Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) 
These measures are quantitative, and demonstrate mathematical value for the 
research questions proposed in the thesis introduction. Two separate software 
applications: RF Monitor and IX Chariot were used to analyze the performance of the M-
FLAK in the 80216 network topology.  
RF Monitor performed a dB measurement of the RF signal from AN-50 radio 
bridge to bridge. The dB measurements taken by the RF monitor can be used to establish 
the distance the links are capable of reaching, as well the survivability of the links in 
adverse conditions such as climate changes, as well as the effects of kinematics upon the 
performance of the link.  
IX Chariot is a network management tool, which measures bandwidth between 
network link access points and bridges. IX Chariot, much like RF monitor, enabled a  
 
 
                                                 
135 Kestrel Camera, Switch, Patrolcam, and VOIP phones. 
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numerical measurement of the bandwidth maintained by the IEEE 802.16 links. All of the 
results from these tests were integrated in chart form to establish performance parameters 
of the equipment.  
 
5. Pre-Deployment Exercises (December 2006) 
The initial M-FLAK tests involved only one IEEE 802.16 AN-50M mobile box 
and a PtMP AN-50e base station. These tests occurred at Pt Sur and were originally 
intended to be conducted using USCG boats off of the coast of Pt Sur in California. 
Unfortunately for planning and testing purposes, equipment was not available until the 
after commencement of the trials, and the over-water portion of the tests had to be 
canceled.  
A reduced proof of concept was conducted using an AN-50e PtMP unit and an 
AN-50M placed on a 4X4 Jeep Cherokee. Short range runs were devised over the limited 
driving area in order to establish a baseline of RF parameters under different speed 
conditions. Since there was a much reduced ability to drive over the terrain at the Pt Sur 
station, the test was limited to less than a quarter mile distance. Also, the elevation of the 
region prevented long directional tests on the equipment. These were scheduled for future 
iterations in January and February of the following year. 
 
 
Figure 49.   USN SOSUS Station Pt Sur, CA Sonar Station  
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The collective tests resulted in a steady short range PtMP link which base-lined at 
35Mbps in straightaway driving and 16Mbps during erratic and evasion driving. These 
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Table 1.   Point Sur PtMP IX Chariot throughput tests (straightaway driving) 
 
In Table 1, the performance measurements reflect a 16 Mbps level of throughput 
during erratic driving136. The increase to an 18 Mbps average occurred when the profile 
of the driving shifted to a different vehicle profile with fewer blockages from the frame 
of the Jeep Cherokee’s luggage racks. This affirms the need for proper antenna placement 
when dealing with a mobile vehicle. Considerations for whip antennas or electronically 
steer-able antenna (ESA), both of which could operate above the vehicle superstructure, 
are planned for future testing iterations as resources permit.   
 After the straightway trials were conducted, erratic driving patterns were executed 
in order to measure the ability of the link to be maintained while pursuit patterns were 
being executed. 360 spins, high accelerations, quick decelerations, and zig-zag patterns 
were driven over off-road terrain in order to test the link throughput loosely simulating 
                                                 
136 Zig-zag patterns as well as full 360 and 180 turns  
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pursuit and interdiction maneuvers of a small boat. The off-road terrain enabled enough 
















Table 2.   PT Sur Erratic Driving IX Chariot results 
  
Although there was a significant decrease in throughput detected be IX Chariot 
when severe turns and driving patterns were enacted, these decreases were not enough to 
sever the link between the AN-50e at a fixed operations center and the AN-50M placed in 
the Jeep. The most significant degradation occurred during turns which blocked the 
















Table 3.   Point Sur Erratic Driving IX Chariot results - reduced throughput due to vehicle 
superstructure 
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6. Pre-Deployment Exercises (February 2006) 
Prior to deploying the COASTS 2006 network topology to Thailand, a full-scale 
integrated test was conducted at Fort Hunter-Liggett (FHL), CA, to test the operational 
capabilities of the architecture. This scenario utilized NEMESIS; a twenty-four foot long 
recreational vehicle (RV) converted into a multi-mission network and communications 
research vehicle for NPS. NEMESIS represented the deployable Tactical Operations 
Center (TOC) which would be established at Mae Ngat Dam in Chiang Mai, Thailand. 
This represented the first full establishment of the tactical network topology of the 
COASTS project, to include the maritime topology tested in this thesis.  
The maritime network topology was evaluated in the following land-based 
configuration. The Redline AN-50e PtMP radio in the NEMESIS RV was connected to a 
30 degree 5.8 GHz, 14-dbi antenna. The Redline AN-50M was placed in the cab of a 
NPS government Ford F-150 pick-up truck, and then connected to another 30 degree 
antenna, identical to the one on the NEMESIS RV. The antenna, placed on a six foot 
tripod in the bed of the pick-up truck, simulated the raised antennas to be used on the 
small boats in Thailand. Two COASTS team-members braced the antenna mount and 
turned the antenna pole to ensure the 30 degree antenna in the truck was always directed 




Figure 50.   90 Degree 5.8 GHz antenna w/ T-58 Transceiver   
 
The FHL runway, which measured one-mile in length, was used to simulate the 
over-water area of operations planned for the Mae Ngat Dam exercise. Also, these tests 
were conducted in order to have data to support an over-land and over-water comparison.   
Various driving patterns were designed for the pick-up truck in order to mirror the 
interdiction maneuvers of small boats in riverine and littoral maritime environs. The first 
driving pattern was a simple straightaway pattern conducted in order to ascertain the 
maximum effective distance for the given antenna configurations. The IX Chariot 
throughput from this iteration resulted in an average of 32 Mbps throughout the 
straightaway driving test.  
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Table 4.   FHL Throughput tests 
 
The test was conducted driving away from the NEMESIS antenna, and then on 
the return along the runway to the RV. The data showed no degradation at a distance of 
over one mile over ground137. The terrain at the end of the runway was impassible, 
making it impossible to evaluate the network at greater ranges.   
The repetition of the erratic driving portions from Pt. Sur, even at the greater 
distances of one mile from the NEMESIS RV, resulted in a throughput level comparable 
to the straightaway tests. An average of 32 Mbps was recorded during the usage of the 
rotating simulated ESA antenna despite the speeds applied to these trials138. 
                                                 
137 The measurements on this distance are ground miles (1760 yards) – later measurements will be in 
nautical miles during the over-water tests in Monterey, CA 
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Table 5.   FHL Throughput tests 
 
During the FHL tests, service-members and civilians from the Joint Information 
Operations Center (JIOC) were on-hand for passive and active signal collection to 
prepare for Red Team scenarios to be conducted during the May Thailand deployment. 
The JIOC team attempted to use RF jamming139 in order to interfere with the 
IEEE 802.16 signal being used during the experiment at various stepped levels of dB. An 
AXIS 213 IP camera was used to conduct a visual feed alongside the IX chariot results. 
Also, the C3Trak chat function was used to measure the ability to maintain a data 
throughput alongside the video feeds and IX Chariot readouts. This way, a measured 
degradation could be seen in the applications on the network as well as the network itself.  
The JIOC induced jamming was able to completely disrupt the camera feed from 
the IP camera. The moment the jamming began, the camera feed would halt. There was 
also a noticeable degradation in signal (observable on the IX chariot console) in the initial 
moments of the jamming. However, this degradation was never more than 2-4 Mbps, and 
the link was never degraded enough to be considered non-functional. All chat data 
transfer continued through the jamming.  
                                                 
139 The jamming applied by the JIOC team was a layer 1 barrage jam, using superior power to disrupt 
the signal. There was no specific address information used to target the base station specifically. The jam 
was entirely centered in the Physical Layer.  
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Furthermore, the loss of the camera feeds created obvious indications of jamming 
which could be detected by an operator. The link degradation in throughput was modeled 
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Table 6.   FHL Throughput tests during JIOC Jamming 
 
In the graph above, the short drops in Mbps can be explained by the jamming 
techniques. The drops to 20 Mbps occurred during periods when the JIOC team increased 
dB power from their RF jamming antenna. These drops to 20 Mbps were at the most 
significant levels attained by the antenna configuration used by JIOC during these tests.   
Interestngly, the IEEE 802.16 network was fairly resistant to the jamming efforts 
undertaken by the JIOC Red Team at FHL. Also, the jamming attacks were easily 
detected by watch-standers at the TOC in the NEMESIS RV..  
 
7. COASTS Deployment to Thailand (March 2006) 
Ten students, two naval reservists, three NPS faculty, and four civilian contractors 
deployed to Thailand on the 20th of March, 2006. The mission goal was to establish the 
COASTS 2006 network topology at the Mae Ngat Dam in the Chiang Mai district of 
Northern Thailand. The objective of the March deployment was to test the total network 
architecture and rehearse the scenario for the May 2006 demonstration. 
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Due to various hardware and software problems with the network configuration, 
very little testing with the Maritime FLAK was accomplished. New design configurations 
for the FLAK were devised through hands-on contractor interaction. 
The shore-side antennas were set up with a single two-way splitter between the T-
58e Transceiver and the two Hyperlink 17 dBi antennas.  A standard RJ6 cable connected 
the T-58e to the AN-50e140, which was directly connected to the TOC’s Tactical 
Communications Kit (TCK) by a CAT-6 crossover cable. The TCK, at this point, 
replaced the entire networking topology configuration used within the NEMESIS van 
during the pre-deployment tests. 
 
 
Figure 51.   Tactical Operating Center  
  
From the network TOC, the various COASTS links to the operational and global 
strategic databases and watch stations were maintained. From the TCK (located in the 
bottom right of the picture), these feeds were linked and routed, and then connected to the 
maritime AN-50e through a 300 foot RG-6 coaxial cable line.  The AN-50e was then 
connected to the shore arrays. 
                                                 
140 The AN-50e used in the Thailand tests was configured without the increased Mbps firmware 
loaded on the AN-50e used during the FHL and Pt Sur PtMP tests. This was a decision made due to budget 
constraints, but since the RF propagation has been tested to be the same in both levels of throughput, it was 
considered to be a minor inconvenience. This means that the lesser bandwidth experienced in the following 
iterations was accounted for, and not necessarily due to any factors in the testing.  
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Figure 52.   180 degree array used at the Mae Ngat Dam during testing   
 
Various different antenna configurations were used on the speed boat during 
testing. The first design was an array of four Superpass 13 dBi, 90 degree sector 
antennas, which were linked by RF cables, combined to a single four-way splitter. The 
splitter, much like the two-way splitter used on the shore array, was then connected to a 
T-58e by separate RF cables. The RJ6 cable then linked the T-58e to the AN-50M radio.  
 
Figure 53.   360 degree omni-sector array using 13 dBi 90 degree sectored antennas    
99 
The Modular PC was mounted onto the SKB cases. The ability to use the Modular PC as 
a stationary portion of the FLAK on the boat, as well as a detached wearable module 
among the boarding party, makes the data-collection potential of the VBSS boarding 
team significantly greater than currently in use today. Upon the installation of the roto-
shock SKB case to the motorboat, it was found that the form factor of the SKB case was 
a significant impedance to personnel movement within the boat. At this point, the 
intention of reducing the size of SKB case used was decided.  
 
 
Figure 54.   SKB Case with the Modular PC mount     
 
 The overall results of these maritime tests were less impressive than the 
performances in FHL only one month before. This was primarily due to the usage of four 
90 degree antennas in a 360 degree array format, resulting in a reduction in RF 
transmission power, i.e. power was split between each of the four array antennas. As 
opposed to a one mile plus distance, which was observed at FHL, a distance of only three 
tenths of a mile could be maintained over water. Although a full 15 Mbps was achieved 
while the connection was maintained, the distances observed during FHL were not 





 After some troubleshooting, the another reason for the lack of propagation was 
found to be due to a lack of proper antenna placement. The vertical beam width of the 90 
degree sector antennas was very narrow, thus the shore and maritime antennas had to be 
at almost the exact same elevation.   
 
8. Monterey USCG Maritime Tests (April 2006) 
One month after the return from the March 2006 tests in Thailand, more maritime 
testing was conducted on the 28th of April. The USCG station Monterey was used as the 
shore staging area, and the USCG patrol vessel, Motor Life Boat (MLB) 47 was used as 
the maritime node. The lessons of the March deployment to Thailand were applied and 
the placement of the shore arrays was optimized based on the physical location of the 
maritime antenna.  
A shore array was constructed using three of the Hyperlink 17dBi antennas, 
forming 270 degree coverage over the bay. The three antennas were linked to a T-58e 
transceiver by a splitter. LT Bill Wren, JP Pierson, and LT Jonathon Powers operated the 





Figure 55.   Shore Array used during PtMP testing at the USCG pier in Monterey, CA 
 
The mobile unit, an AN-50M, was connected to a single omni-directional 12dbi 
antenna. A T-58e was used in the link, but no splitter was added in order to reduce the RF 
losses experienced in Thailand.   
Both the Redline RF analyzer and an IX Chariot network analysis software suite 
were used to test the network links. Repeated tests of RF monitor and IX Chariot were 
used to check the dB levels and throughput of the signal. Incremental distance increases 
of 500 yards were applied during successive trials. 
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The resulting RF monitor feeds showed only minor degradations as the distance 
increased, reducing from an average of 57dB signal strength to an average of 87 dB over 
a period of 70 minutes141 which correlated to a maximum effective distance of 3NM.  












Table 7.   RF distance test to 3NM in the Monterey Bay  
 
9. COASTS Deployment to Thailand (May 2006) 
Six of the students from the March deployment, along with ten naval reserve 
support officers and enlisted, three NPS faculty, and fifteen civilian contractors deployed 
for the COASTS 2006 final technology demonstration.  This iteration would entail the 
final scenario, including the fully intended network M-FLAK periphery technologies.  
 New adaptations to the FLAK were implemented based on lessons learned from 
the March deployment, as well as ship to shore tests with the USCG on April 28th. The 
flowing equipment was added to the FLAK: 
• SP8L Sensor Probe Eight Linux 
• Patrolcam  
• Kestrel USB Camera with a USB connection 
• Mesh Dynamics 802.11g 400mw radio access point  
• Biometric capable PDA 
• VoIP Phone  
 
                                                  
141 89 db is where the signal is considered degraded enough to be lost.  
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The SKB roto-shock cases used in the first tests were replaced with an SKB roll shock 
case. The roto-shock case, although more than adequate, was slightly too large for use 
with small boats. Since the M-FLAK needs to fit on small watercraft like the longboats 
used on rivers in Southeast Asia, a reduced footprint from the new SKB case was 
required.  
 Upon arrival in Thailand, a new dual shore array network was constructed with 
two arrays established at separate locations on the dam shoreline. These two arrays were 
strategically placed in order to maximize the performance of the IEEE 802.16 links 
between the two mobile small boats, and to ultimately extend the RF range recorded 
during the March tests. 
 During the initial tests on the M-FLAK, a steady camera feed from the Patrolcam 
was used as a visual guideline to augment the IX Chariot and RF monitor data being 
received and recorded.  
 On May 23rd, the first M-FLAK was constructed and placed on the speedboat for 
testing. The first network trial involved one boat operating within the coverage area of 
the combined shore arrays. Initial trials mirrored the RF performance which occurred in 
March, where the link maintained 15Mbps, but was unable to maintain link at distances 
greater than one KM without losing RF connectivity. After some trouble-shooting, the 
configuration on the shore antennas was found to be out of alignment.  
 On May 24th, the M-FLAK was re-deployed with the shore antenna moved to an 
elevation almost ten feet higher on the dam face. Upon initialization of the link, the 
throughput leapt to 15Mbps again. This link was then maintained across the entire dam 
waterway, with NLOS connectivity maintained around the bend of the river (almost one 
tenth of a mile) at the same levels of throughput.  
 After ascertaining the network coverage for the river scenario, the speedboat was 
used to establish the ability of the link to be maintained by the M-FLAK at higher speeds. 
For the next series of trials, the speed of the boat was increased to 25 knots, the intended 
level of velocity to be used during the interdiction portion of the scenario. The link 
maintained an average throughput of 15 Mbps, although the higher speed did result in a 
small reduction in dB as observed on RF monitor.  However small antenna alignments 
corrected the decreases experienced in March. 
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 On May 25th, the same tests as conducted on May 23rd and 24th were repeated in 
order to show a consistent performance, as well as practice for the scenario. As the 
speedboat traveled across the water at a speed of 23 knots, RF monitor was used to test 
the dB strength of the IEEE 802.16 signal and the ability of the network to maintain 
connectivity. At a continual ping, only ten out of three hundred packets were dropped. 
Also, the RF signal never dipped during the high speed run and an increase of dB 



























Table 8.   RF Monitor Results from a high speed run (23 Knots) on the Mae Ngat Dam 
 
 Two boat tests were also conducted at the Mae Ngat Dam, with separate AN-
50e’s feeding dedicated T-58e transceivers and antennas on the shore antenna array. Each 
boat operated an M-FLAK, and was equipped with a 90 degree sector antenna. The AN-
50e’s operated PtP firmware, limiting the exchange between communications sectors. 
The results of each RF monitor and IX chariot tests mirrored the individual boat trials. 
 In these tests, the second M-FLAK was operated on an indigenous Thailand 




Figure 56.   LT Hochstedler operating M-FLAK on Thailand longboat 
 
The integration of the MeshDynamic IEEE 802.11 wireless access point was the 
next obstacle to the completion of the M-FLAK. The M-FLAK was not able to integrate 
the MeshDynamic capability due to hardware issues with the network connections to the 
IEEE 802.16 AN-50M in the M-FLAK.  However, a D-Link access point was purchased 
and was added to replace the MeshDynamic box. With a few hours of configuration, the 
addition of the D-Link box established a connection from the Modular PC to the TOC via 
a wireless connection. This new link enabled the Kestrel camera feed from the individual 
boarding officer to be transmitted back to any location on the link. 
 The Kestrel camera, despite being a propriety camera much like the Patrolcam, 
was successfully integrated on the wireless network. The video feed from the boarding 
camera, mounted on the shoulder of LT Hochstedler, was able to collect and transmit a 
consistent video and data feed through the M-FLAK IEEE 802.16 link, and to the TOC 
over a half mile away. With the ranges observed through field testing of the IEEE 802.16 
AN-50s VBSS, harbor security, and maritime defense missions can be potentially 




























A. RESEARCH SUMMARY 
Equipment conforming to the IEEE 802.16 standard can fulfill the multiple 
C4ISR operational requirements of not only US maritime and riverine forces, but 
coalition assets as well. Furthermore, these technologies are COTS, and thus can be 
implemented in a much shorter time-frame than equipment procured through the DoD 
acquisition system. All of the periphery technologies tested with the M-FLAK were a 
success once final architectural designs were completed. Due to the high levels of 
mission requirements being levied on current US and coalition military forces in the 
GWOT, a short-term solution is not only necessary, but vital.  
The NECC’s riverine squadron will be deploying to Iraq in less than a year, while 
the US Naval Coastal Warfare forces will be deploying globally in the same time frame. 
These small boats need to be integrated into the current NCW mission topologies in order 
to enable the National Fleet concepts being directed through the QDR by the DHLS and 
DoD.  
Concerning the end system technology which was used on the M-FLAK, there are 
specific requirements which need to be implemented in order to design operable 
equipment on the network. The strategy for the implementation of a GIG requires: 
• LAN 
• Terrestrial WAN 
• Radio-WAN 
• End-to-end security measures 
• End-to-end management 
• Next generation protocols 
 
LAN – A local area network (LAN) simply needs to be architected along the lines 
defined previously, where all end systems should be linked to a local area network. This 
is emphasized in principle #1 and was done by instantiating the network along this 
architectural design on each small boat.  
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Terrestrial WAN – All LANs should be interoperable by connecting them, via a 
router, to a larger wide area network. The GIG-BE is defined along these lines, and will 
fulfill these requirements if used in this manner. No other adaptation is required due to 
the implemented commercial technology upon which the GIG was built. The TCK router 
served as the link back to the fixed internet, connecting the link via the second principle 
in the architecture requirements.  
Radio-WAN – in order to extend the reach to mobile platforms, digital radio 
systems to extend the last mile reach of the network footprint to the disadvantage user are 
necessary. Commercial technology has only recently achieved the level of accomplishing 
this feat through the IEEE standards established at the turn of the century. The IEEE  
802.16 standard enables the connectivity between principles #1 and #2 in the 
requirements addressed through the Buddenberg MANET articles.   
End-to-end security measures – the passage of data across the entire information 
system, to include the fixed internet, regardless of its level of trustworthiness. The data 
must be secure from writer to user or in another manner of thought, from sensor to 
shooter.  
Since traditional encryption is operated at layer one of the OSI model, it is 
susceptible to future “Walker Case” thefts. A Layer 7 end-to-end security protocol would 
protect the network more robustly, and with less of a footprint, than separate cryptology 
applications.  
Protection from insider attacks needs to addressed by network security managers. 
All end systems must be protected at the level of security established with the rest of the 
network topology.  
End-to-end management – the entire network must be maintained and managed. 
The Navy has created the necessary skill-sets with its creation of the Information 
Professional (IP) Officers and the merging of the traditional Radioman and Data 
Professional rates into the Information Tech enlisted rate. These naval personnel can 
easily extend their mission to incoporate commercial network technology. 
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Next generation protocols – Current network protocols include IPv4, TCP, OSPF, 
and BGP. Future protocols applicable to the military networks are: IPv6 and Nak-only 
reliable multicast (NORM). These protocols can greatly enhance the capabilities of 
current COTS technology architectures142. 
Requirements for an effective modularized MANET end system will include: 
• A LAN interface 
• An enveloping definition (MIME or XML are good examples) 
• A means for authentication and encrypting data (e.g. S/MIME, XML-sign 
and –crypt) 
• Setting of DSCP on exiting datagrams for QoS puposes 
• An SNMP agent that affords both local and remote manageability143 
Coalition allies are facing asymmetric threats in their waters on a regular basis. 
Furthermore, the need for Global ISR extends far beyond the capabilities of current US 
maritime platforms to reach every un-patrolled region in the world’s waterways. 
Coalition maritime security initiatives are growing, increasing the need for interoperable 
networked communications capabilities.  
In many cases, allies seeking to implement this technology in their maritime 
forces do not have the significant operating budgets to purchase extremely expensive 
C4ISR technology from the US. The cost of the COTS components used to build the M-
FLAK averages $25,000 dollars US144.   This per node figure does not include the cost of 
establishing a TOC in order to coordinate the communications links to the deployed M-
FLAKs. Situational awareness applications, security applications, and satellite links are 
also excluded from this cost, and are considered to be applications derived from 
integration into the overall NCW topologies. 
The characterization of political-military relations between various countries and 
the US establish many obstacles which prevent the large-scale deployments of US                                                  
142 It is important to note that these protocols are not vital, and are simply noted in this thesis to 
highlight the future developments which can be used to enhance the current architecture without starting 
from the zero-point in future designs.  
143 Buddenberg, “Objective, Architecture, and Strategy for Network-Centric: A Perspective on Mobile 
Communications, pg. 3 
144 These figures include no calculations concerning maintenance, up-keep, and life-cycle costs. This 
is simply an analysis of equipment purchase. Any assessment of total cost must integrate the total 
architecture, long-term acquisition costs, and spiral upgrades through the full life-cycle of the system.  
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military forces into other countries’ territories. A reduced presence which revolves 
around a limited personnel footprint, but a significant amount of support in the form of 
intelligence collection and increased NCW capabilities needs to be implemented. In the 
maritime theatres of rivers and littoral waters, these situations are perhaps the most 
difficult locations to extend “last mile” reach. By implementing the M-FLAK into these 
locations, the future of maritime security and riverine operations will be connected into 
the future of NCW in the GWOT. 
 
B.  LESSONS LEARNED 
The M-FLAK performs successfully in adverse environments, to include the 
severe riverine domain of the Mekong River tributaries in Thailand. Consistent 
temperature and humidity measurements were taken throughout the testing in Thailand 
and California by the COASTS Data Collection team, and there was no reduction in RF 
connectivity or throughput during periods of extreme heat and rainfall145. Significant 
bandwidth was maintained at all speed profiles, to include interdiction speeds. RF 
connectivity was maintained over a significant distance in the majority of the tests and 
trials. 
The main obstacle to establishing a small boat IEEE 802.16 network topology is 
the initial antenna configuration. Once the antenna configuration was established, the 
follow-on configuration changes were simple and easy to implement.  The next 
significant obstacle was the difficulty of dealing with and integrating proprietary 
technologies. 
It is important to note that these assessments in the lessons learned section 
concern the current COTS technologies. Newer technologies will always be developed as 
end systems, and the ability to upgrade to these newer systems must be apart of any 
acquired network architecture. Therefore these lessons learned are merely observations 
concerning the current M-FLAK end systems used.  
    
                                                 
145 Antenna configuration accounted for the reduced distanced experienced during the March 2006 
Tests in Thailand. Topography resulted in the reduced distances experienced in the December 2005 tests at 
Pt Sur, CA.   
111 
1. Overall Network Lessons Learned 
a. IEEE 802.16  Antenna Placement 
The most important lesson for the network topology is the proper analysis 
of RF study prior to antenna placement. The amount of time spent adjusting antennas, 
calculating Fresnel zone limits, and changing out antennas severely interfered with the 
time available for research. Usage of RF analyzers to test the propagation in the region 
will also greatly reduce the set-up time needed to establish these networks in the field.  
  
b. AN-50e and AN-50M Terminals 
The COASTS field experiments resulted in continual losses of AN-50s, 
both E and M, through operator error. The AN-50’s IF ports can be damaged to the point 
of inoperability by simply not tightening the connections on the RJ6 cables when the unit 
is turned on. This delicate portion of the radio system requires adjustment in order to 
prevent continual losses of equipment during operational missions. 
 
2. End Systems Technologies 
a. Kestrel Camera 
The Kestrel camera performed as required, transmitting feeds through the 
network. Continued research into fully integrating the camera as an IP camera is 
recommended.  As an IP camera, necessary software applications were required to utilize 
it during boarding operations and were added separately from the hardware. Adding a 
firmware IP protocol would be expensive, but it would simplify the ability to include the 
video feed into current and future SSAs.  
Per the end system “good citizen” requirements, the Kestrel camera, in its 
current incarnation, is not adequate for the defined architecture. It required a software 
application to possess a LAN interface, which established its lack of the other parameters. 
Changing the Kestrel to be a LAN camera with the rest of the end system architecture 
requirements will greatly enhance a wonderful proprietary technology to a full network 




The Patrolcam performed extremely well in the maritime environment. 
The video feeds were clear and easy to manipulate.. The steer-able capability of the 
camera enabled a target of interest to be tracked at great distances146. The Patrolcam had 
to be hard-mounted into place in order to receive the best video feeds from the camera. 
When the camera was first placed into position, it jittered from the vibration of the 
speedboat engine.  
Also, since the Patrolcam is a proprietary technology, it does not feed 
directly into the SSA. Much like the Kestrel unit, a firmware addition which would 
include the camera on a TCP/IP protocol, would greatly expand the versatility of the 
package. 
Furthermore, the Patrolcam cannot function without technologies to make 
it LAN-interface capable. This also means that there are no conflicting software 
applications which need to be removed in order to develop the Patrolcam into a fully 
developed networked end system.   
 
c. Identix IBIS  
The Identix biometric device performed well in the field. Fingerprints and 
photographs were easily taken by the device. Integration of the handheld unit applications 
into the Modular PC and the Kestrel camera would greatly reduce the footprint of the M-
FLAK equipment.  
The IBIS is a TCP/IP product, and therefore can be a fully configured and 
networked end system. With the LAN interface, biometric data can be passed from the 
unit to any receiving server on the network. Due to the inability to fully the integrate the 
IBIS on this deployment to Thailand, the rest of the network capabilities were unable to 
be tested.  
There was considerable effort placed into establishing the Identix 
biometrics server onto the COASTS network. This was due to the short timeframe  
 
                                                 
146 Over one mile in range  
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between the receipt of the device, and the final deployment to Thailand for the scenario. 
Since the technology is TCP/IP based, network configuration simply requires lead-time 
and proper network management.  
 
d. Modular PC 
The addition of the Modular PC to the M-FLAK enabled the ease of 
personal computing in the extreme adverse conditions of Northern Thailand. With an 
average of 100 degrees Fahrenheit during mid-day testing, and a near continual rainfall in 
the May scenarios, the Modular PC operated with 100 percent success in the field.   
The Modular PC will expand its ability to function in military applications 
through MIL-STD hardening of the wearable module. Also, there are integrated 
keyboards which dual as screen shields for the module and are being developed for future 
design iterations of this unique computer design.  
The Modular PC is capable to be a totally networked end system. With the 
fully functional operating system, the modular unit can handle any software loads to 
improve the secondary parameters to support the LAN interface with the network.  
 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH AREAS AND QUESTIONS 
 There are a myriad of directions which can be taken in continued research on the 
M-FLAK. The primary ones will focus on the network design according to the two 
MANET principles of NCW. The secondary ones will focus on the refinements 
concerning end system technologies, primarily in the focus of creating more network 
“good citizens” for a more developed MANET architecture.  
 
1. Critical Research Areas 
a. Electronic Steerable Antennas (ESA) 
Although omni-directional and array antennas were the primary means of 
RF propagation used in this research, alternate tests were conducted with various 
simulated steerable antennas. Further research into the development of an electronic-
steerable antenna could greatly increase the versatility of the maritime FLAK.  
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At Fort Hunter-Liggett, a single 30 degree antenna was used on the 
“shore” station and on the simulated small boat. Even when driving at speeds of 40 mph 
in a zig-zag pattern, close to 32 Mbps was maintained - at a range of over one mile. 
Although similar results were achieved during tests in Monterey with an omni-directional 
antenna, the ability to connect over greater and greater ranges could be achieved by using 
multiple ESA antenna connections.  
Furthermore, an IP camera link was maintained throughout testing, with 
video being passed over the PtMP network at a close to real-time speed. Building on this 
foundation, ESA style antennas would be ideal for the mobile applications involving high 
speed vessels.     
 
b. IEEE 802.16  Amplifiers 
The use of amplifiers in conjunction with an IEEE 802.16 network 
topology has not been studied in depth relative to military applications. According to the 
manufacturer, reductions in bandwidth will result when amplifying the current Redline 
AN-50 signal, and ultimately a significant loss of data throughput.  This throughput may 
cause losses much like RF interference in IEEE 802.16, where OFDM enables enough 
data to pass in order to maintain PtP and PtMP data links. In situations where range in 
NLOS environments would be necessary as opposed to wider bandwidth, this capability 
could be expanded by the use of amplifiers.  
Also the management of amplifiers in the post-splitter position on the 
shore and ship based antenna arrays is a recommended area of research.  
 
c. Norsat 5200 KU-10W-P3K 
The Norsat Corporation has added a new satellite communications kit to 
its inventory which would complement the maritime FLAK, particularly in the remote 
riverine environment. The NORSAT fulfills the satellite mobility link to the M-FLAK by 




Some riverine missions will entail a total separation from other GCE and 
composite forces for recon, and a connection along a land-based network topology will 
not be available. A portable satellite connection would be ideal in these long-range OTH 
missions. 
  
d. Riverine Maritime Security Coalition Communications Doctrine 
The adaptation of coalition communications into so many aspects of the 
maritime security and riverine requires a further expansion of the writings on these 
subjects. Every interaction with the Thai military highlighted lessons learned which 
needed to be incorporated into testing parameters. This issue is extremely important for 
countries not restricted by FCC regulations.  For example, the Royal Thai Air Force 
employed a 5W 802.11g air-to-ground network link which had adverse effects upon the 
COASTS network performance. Since riverine warfare has shown a consistent 
requirement for joint operations, to include Close Air Support (CAS), the network 
configurations of deployed collation forces will continue to be a source of concern.    
 
e. Alternate COTS IEEE 802.16 Commercial Vendors 
When this thesis was initially launched, Redline Communications was the 
only vendor of commercial IEEE 802.16 equipment. They also produced the only mobile 
IEEE 802.16 unit. Since then, new companies have produced IEEE 802.16 technology 
with different technological capabilities which should be tested in comparison with 
Redline Communications equipment.  For example, Orthogon Systems, Inc. has produced 
a networking suite which incorporates new advances in mobile IEEE 802.16 
technologies: 
• I-OFDM – Intelligent Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing 
• Multi-Beam / Space Time Coding 
• Advanced Spectrum Management with Intelligent Dynamic Frequency 
Selection  
• Inherent Spatial Diversity 
• Adaptive Modulation147 
                                                  
147 Orthogon Technologies, pg. - 2 November 2, 2005 
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According to Orthogon press releases, these adaptations to the IEEE 
802.16 standard achieve 99.99% reliability at service levels as high as 300 Mbps at 
ranges of 20 miles over water148. These capabilities should be tested in comparable 
situations as the Redline equipment.  
 
f. Multi-boat PtMP IEEE 802.16 Testing  
The time restraints on the research project resulted in insufficient time to 
conduct multi-boat testing with a PtMP array. All multi-boat testing was conducted using 
multiple AN-50s and feeding individual T-58es and antennas. A worthwhile addition to 
M-FLAK testing would be an examination of multi-boat throughput testing, as well as RF 
monitoring for the range of the signals.  
By managing PtMP antennas, more versatile and cost-effective maritime 
security topologies could be implemented. It will be easier to connect multiple, moving 
small boats, with a PtMP antenna design and firmware upload than with multiple single 
PtP arrays. Also, multiple boat testing between a PtMP array and PtP array would 
establish the parameters between the two topologies.  
 
g. Alternate Network Topologies 
Fortress Technologies, Inc. is developing a mobile networking suite, 
which combines WAN and LAN technologies in a single encrypted box. The device, if it 
performs at comparable levels to the combined Redline Communications and Mesh 
Dynamics, equipment would greatly reduce the logistics behind the M-FLAK. It would 
also reduce costs by integrating the total Fortress Technologies encrypted suite into the 
technology.  
 
2. Secondary Research Areas 
a. Riverine M-FLAK CONOPS 
A Concept of Operations for integrating the M-FLAK into NECC 
operations will be needed. The tactical decisions made concerning the capabilities of 
small boats outfitted with the M-FLAK needs to be analyzed in the various missions they 
                                                 
148 Ibid 
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will undertake. Specific doctrines for VBSS and maritime security missions need to be 
analyzed, as well as the multiple objectives established for future USN riverine forces. 
The training of small boat operators should also be studied in the M-
FLAK CONOPS. 
 
b. Extended M-FLAK Periphery Technologies  
The shortage of research time and funding resulted in some peripheral 
tests not being completed. An integration of VOIP communication, sensor suites, and 
newer biometrics gear could be advanced. The more technology that can be integrated 
into the Modular PC the more benefit from a logistics stand-point. The IBIS could be 
easily integrated into the computerized functions of the modular PC. Also, software 
packages could be implemented to remove the need for a separate VoIP phone.  
 
c. Design of a USCG Coastal Maritime Radio-WAN 
With the USCG’s UHF-FM analog communications infrastructure already 
in place around the country, an accurate cost/time analysis of the placement of IEEE 
802.16 Radio-WAN architecture, linked into a fixed GIG connection, could be produced. 
With a thorough study of geography and topography, in combination with RF analysis, a 
reasonable link budget could be designed for the optimum placement of antennas and 
equipment in order to fully cover the maritime domain.  
 
3. Tertiary Research Areas 
a. Integration into the Hastily Formed Network (HFN) 
Humanitarian Assistance/Direct Response (HA/DR)  
After the success of the NPS HFN project following the 2005 tsunami in 
Thailand and the Hurricane Katrina response to New Orleans in the same year, the 
advantages of integrating similar joint and coalition wireless communications capabilities 
became apparent. Currently, the NPS HFN project is conducting Ship to Operational 
Maneuver (STOM) research off the coast of Indonesia with the USNS Mercy. The 
integration of the M-FLAK into these testing parameters would be a significant extension 
of the National Fleets’ ability to contribute to HA/DR missions.  
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b. Life-cycle Management Costs of Operating a Squadron of Small 
Boats with the M-FLAK 
The full costs of designing, managing, and operating a small boat 
squadron operating with an M-FLAK topology in various scenarios, i.e. VBSS, riverine 
warfare, and harbor security, would be beneficial to the implementation for the system in 
the long-term. Since various small boat forces have different mission requirements, there 




Overall, the performance of the IEEE 802.16 network topology was equal to the 
mission requirements of creating a modular C4ISR FLAK to counter threats in the 
asymmetric maritime theatre. Based on the current threats to US and coalition assets in 
the maritime theatre, a NCW command and control capability needs to be introduced in 
to the various small boat maritime forces around the globe. The sooner the US extends 
into IEEE 802.16 technologies in a formalized program in order to enhance our real-time 
NCW capabilities at the tactical level, the sooner the maritime forces, in their multiple 
mission areas, can meet these threats.   
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